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ARTICLES 
THE GEOGRAPHY OF REVLON-LAND 
Stephen M. Bainbridge* 
 
In Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., the Delaware 
Supreme Court explained that, when a target board of directors enters 
Revlon-land, the board’s role changes from that of “defenders of the 
corporate bastion to auctioneers charged with getting the best price for the 
stockholders at a sale of the company.” 
Unfortunately, the Court’s colorful metaphor obfuscated some serious 
doctrinal problems.  What standards of judicial review applied to director 
conduct outside the borders of Revlon-land?  What standard applied to 
director conduct falling inside Revlon-land’s borders?  And when did one 
enter that mysterious country? 
By the mid-1990s, the Delaware Supreme Court had worked out a 
credible set of answers to those questions.  The seemingly settled rules 
made doctrinal sense and were sound from a policy perspective. 
Indeed, my thesis herein is that Revlon and its progeny should be praised 
for having grappled—mostly successfully—with the core problem of 
corporation law:  the tension between authority and accountability.  A fully 
specified account of corporate law must incorporate both values.  On the 
one hand, corporate law must implement the value of authority in 
developing a set of rules and procedures providing efficient decision 
making.  U.S. corporate law does so by adopting a system of director 
primacy. 
In the director primacy (a.k.a. board-centric) form of corporate 
governance, control is vested not in the hands of the firm’s so-called 
owners—the shareholders—who exercise virtually no control over either 
day-to-day operations or long-term policy, but in the hands of the board of 
directors and their subordinate professional managers.  On the other hand, 
the separation of ownership and control in modern public corporations 
obviously implicates important accountability concerns, which corporate 
law must also address. 
Academic critics of Delaware’s jurisprudence typically err because they 
are preoccupied with accountability at the expense of authority.  In 
contrast, or so I will argue, Delaware’s takeover jurisprudence correctly 
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recognizes that both authority and accountability have value.  Achieving the 
proper mix between these competing values is a daunting—but necessary—
task.  Ultimately, authority and accountability cannot be reconciled.  At 
some point, greater accountability necessarily makes the decision-making 
process less efficient.  Making corporate law therefore requires a careful 
balancing of these competing values.  Striking such a balance is the 
peculiar genius of Unocal and its progeny.  
In recent years, however, the Delaware Chancery Court has gotten lost 
in Revlon-land.  A number of chancery decisions have drifted away from 
the doctrinal parameters laid down by the Delaware Supreme Court.  In 
this Article, I argue that they have done so because the Chancellors have 
misidentified the policy basis on which Revlon rests.  Accordingly, I argue 
that chancery should adopt a conflict of interest–based approach to 
invoking Revlon, which focuses on where control of the resulting corporate 
entity rests when the transaction is complete. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Corporation law statutes commonly offer two basic mechanisms by 
which a company may be acquired:  namely, the merger and the sale of all 
or substantially all corporate assets.1  In addition to these statutory 
acquisition techniques, there are a number of nonstatutory acquisition 
methods, including the proxy contest, the tender offer, and stock 
purchases.2  Among many factors distinguishing the two categories, one of 
the most important is the role of the target’s board of directors.  Statutory 
forms, such as a merger or asset sale, require approval by the target’s 
board.3  In contrast, the nonstatutory techniques do not.  A proxy contest 
obviously does not require board approval, although a shareholder vote is 
 
 1. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251 (2011) (merger); id. § 271 (sale of all or 
substantially all corporate assets). See generally STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATE LAW 
338–40 (2d ed. 2009) (describing basic merger and asset sale techniques, as well as key 
variants thereof). 
 2. See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 1, at 340–41 (describing these techniques).  The 
appellation “statutory acquisition” refers to a form expressly created by state corporation 
codes.  Its counterpart, the term “nonstatutory acquisition,” simply means that it is a form 
whose existence is not dependent on such a code.  In general, however, the latter are not 
unregulated.  Instead, they typically are governed by federal securities law and, in some 
cases, various state laws. Id. at 337 n.1. 
 3. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251(b) (“The board of directors of each 
corporation which desires to merge or consolidate shall adopt a resolution approving an 
agreement of merger or consolidation and declaring its advisability.”); id. § 271(a) (“Every 
corporation may at any meeting of its board of directors or governing body sell, lease or 
exchange all or substantially all of its property and assets . . . as its board of directors or 
governing body deems expedient and for the best interests of the corporation . . . .”). 
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still required.4  A tender offer requires neither board approval nor a 
shareholder vote; if the buyer ends up with a majority of the shares, it will 
achieve control.5 
The need for board approval creates insurmountable barriers to use of a 
statutory form if the bidder is unable to secure board cooperation.  Initially, 
the nonstatutory forms eliminated this difficulty by permitting the bidder to 
bypass the target’s board and obtain control directly from the stockholders.  
Since the 1970s, however, the development of takeover defenses allowed 
the target’s board to play a gatekeeping role in tender offers, not unlike its 
role in statutory acquisition techniques. 
The target board’s gatekeeping function poses the most basic question of 
corporate governance; namely, who decides?  Is the decision to accept or 
reject an offer one for the shareholders or, as with all other important policy 
questions, is it at least initially one for the board?6 
One of the more interesting contexts in which that question arises is the 
jurisprudential territory known as “Revlon-land.”7  In Revlon, Inc. v. 
MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc.,8 the Delaware Supreme Court 
explained that when a target board of directors enters Revlon-land, the 
board’s role changes from that of “defenders of the corporate bastion to 
auctioneers charged with getting the best price for the stockholders at a sale 
of the company.”9 
Unfortunately, the court’s colorful metaphor obfuscated some serious 
doctrinal problems.  What standards of judicial review applied to director 
conduct outside the borders of Revlon-land?  What standard applied to 
director conduct falling inside Revlon-land’s borders?  And when did one 
enter that mysterious country? 
By the mid-1990s, the Delaware Supreme Court had worked out a 
credible set of answers to those questions.10  The seemingly settled rules 
 
 4. See Morton A. Pierce, Mergers and Acquisitions in the 80’s and 90’s, in CONTESTS 
FOR CORPORATE CONTROL 279, 288 (1997) (“The proxy contest is a way to bypass the board 
and enlist the help of stockholders to exert enough pressure on the board to obtain the 
desired result.”). 
 5. Air Prods. & Chems., Inc. v. Airgas, Inc., 16 A.3d 48, 95 (Del. Ch. 2011) (noting 
that “traditionally the board has been given no statutory role in responding to a public tender 
offer”). 
 6. See Michael P. Dooley, Two Models of Corporate Governance, 47 BUS. LAW. 461, 
521 (1992) (suggesting that “the fundamental governance question presented by unsolicited 
offers” is whether the “right to decide whether to accept or reject the offer resides with the 
shareholders or is it, like all other important policy questions, initially a decision for the 
board to make until it reveals itself to be disabled by self-interest”). 
 7. The results of a search of the Westlaw DE-CS database identified the earliest judicial 
use of the term Revlon-land as the Delaware Supreme Court’s decision in Arnold v. Society 
for Savings Bancorp, Inc., 650 A.2d 1270 (Del. 1994), in which the court observed that 
terms like “Revlon duties” and “Revlon-land” were used “colloquially but inappropriately” to 
refer to “the enhanced scrutiny courts accord to certain types of [takeover] transactions.” Id. 
at 1289 n.40. 
 8. 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986). 
 9. Id. at 182. 
 10. See infra Part II.D (discussing relevant precedents). 
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made doctrinal sense and were sound from a policy perspective.11  Indeed, 
my thesis herein is that Revlon and its progeny should be praised for having 
grappled—mostly successfully—with the core problem of resolving the 
tension between authority and accountability.  A fully specified account of 
corporate law must incorporate both values.12 
Academic critics of Delaware’s jurisprudence typically err because they 
are preoccupied with accountability at the expense of authority.13  In 
contrast, or so I will argue, Delaware’s takeover jurisprudence correctly 
recognizes that both authority and accountability have value.14  Achieving 
the proper mix between these competing values is a daunting—but 
necessary—task, because authority and accountability cannot be 
reconciled.15  Making corporate law therefore requires a careful balancing 
of these competing values.  Striking such a balance is the peculiar genius of 
Revlon and its progeny. 
In recent years, however, the Delaware Chancery Court has gotten lost in 
Revlon-land.  A number of chancery decisions have drifted away from the 
doctrinal parameters laid down by the Delaware Supreme Court.16  In this 
Article, I argue that they have done so because the Chancellors have 
misidentified the policy basis on which Revlon rests.  Accordingly, I argue 
that chancery should adopt a conflict of interest–based approach to 
invoking Revlon, which focuses on where control of the resulting corporate 
entity rests when the transaction is complete. 
In order to accurately map Revlon-land, some of the surrounding 
doctrinal territory must also be explored.  Accordingly, Part I of this Article 
begins the analysis by contrasting the target board of directors’ role in 
negotiated acquisitions, such as mergers or asset sales, with its role in 
hostile takeovers.  Part I argues that the target board faces important 
conflicts of interest in both settings, but that the conflicts presented in the 
latter setting are especially significant.  Because Revlon deals only with a 
subset of hostile takeover fights, Part I examines in some detail the 
Delaware Supreme Court’s prior decision in Unocal Corp. v. Mesa 
Petroleum Co.,17 which laid the broader doctrinal foundation on which 
Revlon rests.  In addition, Part I explores the policy tensions the Delaware 
courts were forced to resolve in Unocal and its progeny. 
 
 11. See infra Part II.C (discussing relevant precedents). 
 12. See Dooley, supra note 6, at 463–64 (arguing that “any feasible governance system 
must and does contain elements of both . . . Authority or Responsibility”). 
 13. See, e.g., FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE 
OF CORPORATE LAW 171–74 (1991) (arguing that there are systemic agency cost effects 
when management resists a takeover bid); Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case Against Board 
Veto in Corporate Takeovers, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 973, 993–94 (2002) (discussing the role of 
the hostile takeover as a constraint on agency costs). 
 14. See infra Part II.D (summarizing Delaware law). 
 15. See Dooley, supra note 6, at 464 (noting that authority and accountability “are also 
antithetical, and more of one means less of the other”). 
 16. See infra Part IV. 
 17. 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985). 
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Part II traces the development of Revlon up to the point in the mid-1990s 
at which the law seemed well settled.  Part III maps Revlon-land as it had 
been carved out in that evolutionary process.  In both parts, the Article 
argues that the end result of that process made both doctrinal logic and 
sound policy sense. 
Part IV critiques the recent chancery court cases that have departed from 
the prescribed borders of Revlon-land.  In it, the author argues that those 
cases are inconsistent with prior law and with sound policy. 
I.  REVLON’S ANTECEDENTS 
Revlon and its progeny are a subset of the much larger body of takeover 
jurisprudence whose modern roots go back to Unocal Corp. v. Mesa 
Petroleum Co.18  As a result, one of Revlon-land’s critical landmarks is the 
location of the crossing point at which the case is no longer governed by 
Unocal but rather by Revlon.19  Of course, one also is constrained to ask 
what, if anything, changes when directors morph from “defenders of the 
corporate bastion” into “auctioneers.”20  Accordingly, devoting some 
attention to both the policy questions the Unocal court faced and the 
evolution of the standard that the court developed to answer them is 
necessary to lay the foundation for the analysis of Revlon that follows. 
A.  Who Decides? 
There is no more basic governance question than that of “who decides?”  
Or, put another way, which organizational constituent possesses the 
ultimate right of control? 
Ownership and control rights typically go hand in hand.  A principal is 
entitled to control his agent, for example.21  Each partner is entitled to equal 
rights in the management of the partnership business.22 
In the corporation, however, ownership and control are decisively 
separated.  The Delaware General Corporation Law vests control in the 
board of directors, for example, by providing that the corporation’s 
“business and affairs . . . shall be managed by or under the direction of a 
board of directors.”23  In contrast, the firm’s owners—the shareholders—
exercise virtually no control over either day-to-day operations or long-term 
 
 18. Id.  For a discussion of Delaware’s pre-Unocal takeover jurisprudence and the ways 
in which Unocal superseded it, see BAINBRIDGE, supra note 1, at 386–91 (describing the 
evolution of Delaware law). 
 19. Cf. Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1150–51 (Del. 1989) 
(noting that, in some cases, “Revlon duties are not triggered, though Unocal duties attach” to 
the target’s board of directors and managers). See generally infra note 214 and 
accompanying text (discussing Revlon-triggering events). 
 20. See infra note 217 and accompanying text (discussing whether the Revlon and 
Unocal standards differ). 
 21. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.09 (2006) (setting out an agent’s duty to 
obey the principal). 
 22. UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 4.01(a)(1) (1997). 
 23. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2011). 
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policy.24  Shareholder voting rights are limited to the election of directors 
and a few relatively rare matters such as approval of charter or bylaw 
amendments, mergers, sales of substantially all of the corporation’s assets, 
and voluntary dissolution.25  As a formal matter, moreover, only the 
election of directors and amending the bylaws do not require board 
approval before shareholder action is possible.26  In practice, of course, 
even the election of directors (absent a proxy contest) is predetermined by 
virtue of the existing board’s power to nominate the next year’s board.27  
The shareholders’ limited control rights thus are almost entirely reactive 
rather than proactive.28 
The sharply “limited governance role assigned to shareholders is 
intentional and is, in fact, the genius of the corporate form.”29  This is so 
because, taken together, the rules empowering directors and disempowering 
shareholders create a board-centric form of corporate governance, in which 
the board of directors is not a mere agent of the shareholders, but rather is a 
sui generis body whose powers are original and nondelegated.30  To be 
sure, the directors are obliged to use their powers toward the end of 
shareholder wealth maximization, but decisions as to how that end shall be 
achieved are vested in the board, not the shareholders.31 
The prestigious American Bar Association’s Committee on Corporate 
Laws, which has drafting responsibility for the widely adopted Model 
Business Corporation Act, recently affirmed that director primacy both is 
and ought to be the basic organizing principle of corporate law.  The 
Committee explained that “the deployment of diverse investors’ capital by 
 
 24. See ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND 
PRIVATE PROPERTY 6 (1932) (describing the effects of the separation of ownership and 
control).  I use the term “ownership” here in its colloquial sense, while recognizing that, 
“[i]n the dominant nexus of contracts theory of the firm, ownership is not a meaningful 
concept because shareholders are simply one of the inputs bound together by this web of 
voluntary agreements.” Stephen M. Bainbridge, Why a Board?  Group Decisionmaking in 
Corporate Governance, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1, 4 n.9 (2002). 
 25. See MICHAEL P. DOOLEY, FUNDAMENTALS OF CORPORATION LAW 174–77 (1995) 
(summarizing state corporate law on shareholder voting entitlements). 
 26. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 109, 211 (setting forth shareholder rights). 
 27. See Bayless Manning, Book Review, 67 YALE L.J. 1477, 1485–89 (1958) (reviewing 
J.A. LIVINGSTON, THE AMERICAN STOCKHOLDER (1958)) (describing how incumbent 
directors control the proxy voting machinery). 
 28. Cf. In re CNX Gas Corp. S’holders Litig., 4 A.3d 397, 415 (Del. Ch. 2010) (holding 
that “director primacy remains the centerpiece of Delaware law, even when a controlling 
stockholder is present”). 
 29. Michael P. Dooley, Controlling Giant Corporations:  The Question of Legitimacy, in 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE:  PAST & FUTURE 28, 38 (Henry G. Manne ed., 1982). 
 30. The discussion of director primacy herein draws on earlier work, especially Stephen 
M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy:  The Means and Ends of Corporate Governance, 97 NW. 
U. L. REV. 547 (2003). 
 31. See Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919) (“A business 
corporation is organized and carried on primarily for the profit of the stockholders.  The 
powers of the directors are to be employed for that end.  The discretion of directors is to be 
exercised in the choice of means to attain that end, and does not extend to a change in the 
end itself . . . .”). 
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centralized management maximizes corporate America’s ability to 
contribute to long-term wealth creation.”32  As the Committee further 
explained, the “board centric” model gives shareholders 
the regular opportunity to elect the members of the board, but during the 
directors’ terms, the board has the power, informed by each director’s 
decisions in the exercise of his or her fiduciary duties, to direct and 
oversee the pursuit of the board’s vision of what is best for the 
corporation.33 
The board of directors thus is an example of what Nobel laureate 
economist Kenneth Arrow identified as authority-based decision-making 
structures.34  Such structures are characterized by the existence of a central 
agency to which all relevant information is transmitted and which is 
empowered to make decisions binding on the whole.35  They tend to arise 
where the constituents of an organization have differing interests, there are 
information asymmetries among the constituents, and collective action 
problems make participatory democracy infeasible.36 
The public corporation is a classic example of just such an organization.  
As my colleague Iman Anabtawi observes, “On close analysis, shareholder 
interests look highly fragmented.”37  She documents divergences among 
investors along multiple fault lines, such as short-term versus long-term 
investment horizons, diversified versus undiversified portfolios, inside 
versus outside shareholders, investors with social goals versus those with 
solely economic goals, and hedged versus nonhedged investors.38  Even if 
that were not the case, moreover, shareholders would still face difficult 
collective action problems in making routine corporate decisions.39 
Accordingly, the public corporation succeeded as a business organization 
form because it provides a hierarchical decision-making structure well 
suited to the problem of operating a large business enterprise with 
numerous employees, managers, shareholders, creditors, and other inputs.  
In such a firm, someone must be in charge.  “Under conditions of widely 
 
 32. COMM. ON CORPORATE LAWS OF THE AM. BAR ASS’N SECTION OF BUS. LAW, REPORT 
ON THE ROLES OF BOARDS OF DIRECTORS AND SHAREHOLDERS OF PUBLICLY OWNED 
CORPORATIONS (2010), available at http://www.hunton.com/media/SEC_Proxy/PDF/SEC_
Agenda_Section2.PDF. 
 33. Id. 
 34. KENNETH J. ARROW, THE LIMITS OF ORGANIZATION 68–70 (1974). 
 35. See id. at 69 (providing examples of authority-based decision-making structures). 
 36. Bainbridge, supra note 30, at 557. 
 37. Iman Anabtawi, Some Skepticism About Increasing Shareholder Power, 53 UCLA 
L. REV. 561, 564 (2006). 
 38. See id. at 577–93 (describing such differences in investor interests and preferences). 
 39. See Blake H. Crawford, Eliminating the Executive Overcompensation Problem:  
How the SEC and Congress Have Failed and Why Shareholders Can Prevail, 2 J. BUS. 
ENTREPRENEURSHIP & L. 273, 312 (2009) (“The collective action problem occurs when 
dispersed shareholders, who lack the power to make significant changes individually, remain 
passive in their decisions . . . .”); cf. Lewis v. Vogelstein, 699 A.2d 327, 338 (Del. Ch. 1997) 
(noting that courts “are not unmindful of the collective action problem faced by shareholders 
in public corporations”). 
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dispersed information and the need for speed in decisions, authoritative 
control at the tactical level is essential for success.”40  As we have seen, 
corporate law rests that control in the board rather than the shareholders. 
The ABA Committee justified that statutory allocation of control on 
somewhat different grounds, explaining that if board of director decisions 
were subjected to frequent shareholder review “the time and attention of 
managers could, in many cases, be diverted from activities designed to 
pursue sustainable economic benefit for the corporation.”41  In addition, the 
Committee expressed concern that broad shareholder decision-making 
powers might be abused by “particular shareholders who may have interests 
that diverge from those of other shareholders or interests other than 
sustainable economic benefit.”42  This concern was exacerbated in the 
Committee’s view because noncontrolling “shareholders generally do not 
owe fiduciary duties to each other or the corporation,” which meant that 
they could not be held responsible for how they used the levers of 
shareholder democracy.43 
The core question posed in Unocal and its progeny is whether corporate 
takeovers present unique considerations justifying a less board-centric 
governance regime than that which thus pervades the rest of corporation 
law.  As we shall see, the Delaware courts have concluded that they do 
not.44  In my opinion, the Delaware courts have gotten it broadly right in so 
holding.45 
B.  The Board As Gatekeeper 
In their efforts to decide who decides, the Delaware courts have grappled 
with the limits of a target corporation’s board of directors’ power to act as a 
gatekeeper in corporate acquisitions.  In other words, to what extent can the 
target’s board of directors prevent the target’s shareholders from deciding 
whether the company should be acquired? 
In a merger, two corporations combine to form a single entity.46  In an 
asset sale, the selling corporation transfers all or substantially all of its 
 
 40. ARROW, supra note 34, at 69. 
 41. COMM. ON CORPORATE LAWS, supra note 32, at 5. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. 
 44. See infra Part I.D (discussing Unocal and its progeny). 
 45. See infra Part I.E (discussing policy aspects of Unocal). 
 46. Under Delaware law, effecting this transaction requires four basic steps.  First, an 
“agreement of merger” must be drafted, specifying the deal’s terms and conditions, including 
the terms required by Delaware General Corporation Law § 251(b). DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, 
§ 251(b) (2011).  The board of directors must adopt a resolution approving the agreement.  
The shareholders then must approve the agreement.  Unlike most corporate actions, which 
only require approval by a majority of those shares present and voting, a merger requires 
approval by a majority of the outstanding shares.  Finally, either the agreement or a 
certificate of merger must be filed with the Secretary of State. 
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assets to the buyer.  In both transactions, approval by the target board of 
directors is an essential precondition.47 
In both major forms of statutory acquisitions, the board thus has a 
gatekeeping function.  Shareholders have no power to initiate either a 
merger or asset sale, because the statute makes board approval a condition 
precedent to the shareholder vote.48  If the board rejects a merger proposal, 
the shareholders thus have no right to review that decision.49  Instead, the 
shareholder role is purely reactive, coming into play only once the board 
approves a merger proposal.50 
 The board also has sole power to negotiate the terms on which the 
merger will take place and to enter a definitive merger agreement 
embodying its decisions.  Shareholders have no statutory right to amend 
or veto specific provisions, their role typically being limited to approving 
or disapproving the merger agreement as a whole . . . .51 
If the board disapproves of a prospective acquisition, the would-be 
acquirer therefore must resort to one of the nonstatutory acquisition devices.  
The proxy contest, share purchase, and tender offer all allow the bidder to 
bypass the target board and make an offer directly to the target’s 
shareholders.  Since the 1960s, the tender offer has been the most important 
and powerful of these tools.52  Almost as soon as the hostile tender offer 
emerged as a viable acquirer tactic, however, lawyers and investment 
bankers working for target boards began to develop defensive tactics 
designed to impede such offers.53  If validated by the courts, these takeover 
defenses promised to reassert the board’s primacy by extending its 
gatekeeping function to the nonstatutory acquisition setting. 
Consider the poison pill, for example, which has been called the “de 
rigeur tool of a board responding to a third-party tender offer.”54  Poison 
pills take a wide variety of forms, but most are based on a form of security 
known as a right.55  Traditional rights are issued by corporations in forms 
 
 47. See id. § 251(b) (imposing requirement of board approval of a merger); id. § 271 
(setting forth requirements for asset sale). 
 48. Stephen M. Bainbridge, Exclusive Merger Agreements and Lock-Ups in Negotiated 
Corporate Acquisitions, 75 MINN. L. REV. 239, 259 (1990). 
 49. See id. at 259 n.83 (explaining that “the rejection decision [is] vested in the unilateral 
discretion of the board of directors”). 
 50. Id. at 259. 
 51. Id. 
 52. See Robert B. Thompson & D. Gordon Smith, Toward a New Theory of the 
Shareholder Role:  “Sacred Space” in Corporate Takeovers, 80 TEX. L. REV. 261, 276 
(2001) (noting “the widespread use of the cash tender offer in the 1960s and the rise in 
prominence of hostile takeovers in subsequent decades”). 
 53. For an overview of takeover defenses, see BAINBRIDGE, supra note 1, at 376–86. 
 54. In re Pure Res., Inc., S’holders Litig., 808 A.2d 421, 431 (Del. Ch. 2002). 
 55. BAINBRIDGE, supra note 1, at 379.  The Delaware General Corporation Law 
authorizes corporations to “create and issue . . . rights or options entitling the holders thereof 
to acquire from the corporation any shares of its capital stock of any class or classes, such 
rights or options to be evidenced by or in such instrument or instruments as shall be 
approved by the board of directors.” DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 157(a) (2011). 
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giving the holder the option to buy stock in the issuer on specified terms.56  
In contrast, the poison pill has no real financing purpose.57  Instead, it is 
intended to prohibitively raise the cost of acquiring the issuer without the 
consent of its board.58  In order to do so, the pill includes three additional 
elements not found in traditional rights:  a flip-in element, a flip-over 
element, and a redemption provision.59 
The pill’s flip-in element is triggered by the acquisition by a potential 
bidder of some specified percentage of the issuer’s common stock.60  If 
triggered, the flip-in pill entitles the holder of each right—except the 
potential bidder and its affiliates or associates—to buy authorized but 
unissued shares of the target issuer’s common stock or other securities at a 
substantial discount from the market price.61  The deterrent effect of such a 
flip-in pill arises out of the massive dilution the pill causes to the value of 
the target stock owned by an unwanted acquirer.62 
The pill’s flip-over feature typically is triggered if, following the 
acquisition of a specified percentage of the target’s common stock, the 
target is subsequently merged into the acquirer or one of its affiliates.63  In 
such an event, the holder of each right becomes entitled to purchase 
common stock of the acquiring company, at a substantial discount to 
market, thereby impairing the acquirer’s capital structure and drastically 
diluting the interest of the acquirer’s other stockholders.64 
Because the rights trade separately from the issuer’s common stock, an 
acquirer remains subject to the pill’s poisonous effects even if an 
overwhelming majority of the target’s shareholders accept the bidder’s 
tender offer.65  In the face of a pill, a prospective acquirer thus has a strong 
incentive to negotiate with the target’s board.  Pills therefore include a 
redemption provision pursuant to which the board may redeem the rights at 
 
 56. See WILLIAM A. KLEIN ET AL., BUSINESS ORGANIZATION AND FINANCE:  LEGAL AND 
ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES 295 (11th ed. 2010) (describing stock rights); see also Grimes v. 
Alteon, Inc., 804 A.2d 256, 264–65 (Del. 2002) (holding that the term “right” as used in 
section 157 includes but is not limited to “options or option-like transactions”). 
 57. See Lawrence A. Hamermesh, Corporate Democracy and Stockholder-Adopted By-
laws:  Taking Back the Street?, 73 TUL. L. REV. 409, 440 n.135 (1998) (explaining that “one 
of the criticisms of the ‘poison pill’ was . . . that [it] had no economic substance . . . unless 
and until a hostile acquisition or some other defined triggering event occurred”). 
 58. Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1369 n.6 (Del. 1995) (explaining 
that a poison pill “dilutes the would-be acquiror’s stake in the company and increases the 
costs of acquisition”). 
 59. See KLEIN, supra note 56, at 196 (describing these elements).  Note that the board of 
directors adopts the pill by resolution without any shareholder action. Id. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. 
 65. See, e.g., Grand Metro. Pub. Ltd. v. Pillsbury Co., 558 A.2d 1049, 1051 n.2 (Del. 
Ch. 1988) (explaining that, if triggered, Pillsbury’s poison pill would have reduced Grand 
Met’s interest in Pillsbury from 85 to 56 percent and cut the value of Grand Met’s Pillsbury 
holdings by more than $700 million dollars). 
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a nominal price at any time prior to the right being exercised if a friendly 
deal can be negotiated.66  Proponents of pills contend that these plans thus 
do not deter takeover bids, but rather simply give the target board leverage 
to negotiate the best possible deal for their shareholders or to find a 
competing bid.67  In any case, it is clear that “the poison pill has made the 
board the ‘gatekeeper’ instead of the shareholders.”68  As a result, target 
boards have been empowered to play an active—and often determinative—
role in the very class of transactions originally designed to bypass them 
entirely. 
C.  The Target Board’s Conflict of Interest 
Corporate law’s allocation of primary responsibility for negotiating a 
merger agreement to the target’s board of directors69 is sound policy.  The 
board knows much more than its shareholders about the company’s 
business goals and opportunities.70  The board also knows more about the 
extent to which a proposed merger would promote accomplishment of those 
goals.71  In addition to this information asymmetry, the familiar array of 
collective action problems that plague shareholder participation in corporate 
decision making obviously preclude any meaningful role for shareholders in 
negotiating a merger agreement.72  Taken together, these factors justify 
corporate law’s allocation of the sole power to negotiate mergers to the 
board.  It also justifies the requirement that shareholders vote on the merger 
agreement as a whole, rather than allowing them to approve or disapprove 
specific provisions. 
As with any conferral of plenary authority, the board’s power to make 
decisions about negotiated acquisitions gives rise to the potential for abuse.  
Because the target’s board of directors must approve a merger proposal 
before the transaction is submitted for shareholder approval, the bidder at 
the very least may have to compensate the incumbents for the loss of the 
rents associated with their offices, thereby reducing the amount that can be 
 
 66. See KLEIN, supra note 56, at 196 (describing redemption provisions). 
 67. See id. (describing purported purpose of the pill). 
 68. Wayne O. Hanewicz, When Silence Is Golden:  Why the Business Judgment Rule 
Should Apply to No-Shops in Stock-for-Stock Merger Agreements, 28 J. CORP. L. 205, 237 
(2003). 
 69. See supra notes 48–51 and accompanying text (discussing relevant statutes and case 
law). 
 70. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Is “Say on Pay” Justified?, 32 REG. 42, 47 (2009) 
(“Whatever flaws board governance may have, they pale in comparison to the information 
asymmetries and collective action problems that lead most shareholders to be rationally 
apathetic.”). 
 71. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target’s 
Management in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1161, 1198–99 (1981) 
(arguing that corporate law grants the board decision-making authority because the directors 
have a competitive advantage over the shareholders in choosing between competing 
alternatives). 
 72. See In re Cox Commc’ns, Inc. S’holders Litig., 879 A.2d 604, 619 (Del. Ch. 2005) 
(“A good board is best positioned to extract a price at the highest possible level because it 
does not suffer from the collective action problem of disaggregated stockholders.”). 
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paid to the target shareholders for the sale of the firm.  In addition, the 
bidder may seek to purchase the board’s cooperation by offering directors 
and/or senior managers side payments, such as an equity stake in the 
surviving entity, employment or noncompetition contracts, substantial 
severance payments, continuation of existing fringe benefits, or other 
compensation arrangements.73  Although it is undoubtedly rare for side 
payments to be so large as to materially affect the price the bidder would 
otherwise be able to pay target shareholders, side payments may affect 
target board decision making by inducing the board to agree to an 
acquisition price lower than that which could be obtained from hard 
bargaining or open bidding.74  At the extreme, moreover, incumbents may 
be unwilling to surrender their positions on any terms that are acceptable to 
the bidder. 
Despite this well-known conflict of interest, the Delaware cases 
consistently apply the business judgment rule to board decisions to approve 
a merger.75  This judicial hesitation to second-guess board merger decisions 
is also sound policy, reflecting an appropriate balance between the 
competing claims of authority and accountability. 
Most corporate law scholars “believe that the fundamental concern of 
corporate law is ‘agency costs.’”76  To be sure, this belief has a hallowed 
pedigree.  After all, Berle and Means famously claimed that “the separation 
of ownership from control produces a condition where the interests of 
owner and of ultimate manager may, and often do, diverge, and where 
many of the checks which formerly operated to limit the use of power 
disappear.”77  Noted economists Jensen and Meckling, moreover, 
subsequently formalized this concern by developing the concept of agency 
costs.78 
 
 73. See, e.g., Samjens Partners I v. Burlington Indus., Inc., 663 F. Supp. 614, 617, 620 
(S.D.N.Y. 1987) (white knight offered target management equity stake); Singer v. Magnavox 
Co., 380 A.2d 969, 971 (Del. 1977) (target directors offered employment contracts); Gilbert 
v. El Paso Co., 490 A.2d 1050, 1052 (Del. Ch. 1984) (plaintiff alleged tender offeror 
modified bid to benefit target managers). 
 74. Pupecki v. James Madison Corp., 382 N.E.2d 1030, 1031–32 (Mass. 1978) (plaintiff 
claimed that consideration for sale of assets was reduced due to side-payments to controlling 
shareholder); Barr v. Wackman, 329 N.E.2d 180, 184 (N.Y. 1975) (plaintiff claimed target 
directors agreed to low acquisition price in exchange for employment contracts).  In many 
cases, there may also be at work “a force more subtle than a desire to maintain a title or 
office in order to assure continued salary or prerequisites,” as where managers’ self-identity 
is wrapped up in their employer. Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. Time Inc., 1989 WL 79880, 
at *715 (Del. Ch. July 14, 1989), aff’d, 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1990). 
 75. See, e.g., Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985). 
 76. Kent Greenfield, The Place of Workers in Corporate Law, 39 B.C. L. REV. 283, 295 
(1998). 
 77. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 24, at 6. 
 78. See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm:  Managerial 
Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976).  Agency costs 
are defined as the sum of the monitoring and bonding costs, plus any residual loss, incurred 
to prevent shirking by agents. See Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen, Separation of 
Ownership and Control, 26 J.L. & ECON. 301, 304 (1983).  In turn, shirking is defined to 
include any action by a member of a production team that diverges from the interests of the 
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Granted, deterrence and punishment of misconduct by the board and 
senior management is a necessary function of corporate governance.79  
Accountability standing alone, however, is an inadequate normative account 
of corporate law.80  In order for corporations to be governed efficiently and 
effectively, deference must be paid to the corporation’s authority-based 
decision-making structure.  Because corporate law could substantially 
reduce agency costs by eliminating the board’s discretionary powers, but 
has chosen not to do so, it is reasonable to infer that substantial efficiency 
gains follow from vesting the board with discretionary authority.  A 
complete theory of the firm therefore requires one to balance the virtues of 
discretion against the need to require that discretion be used responsibly.81 
The problem is that achieving an appropriate mix between authority and 
accountability is a daunting task.  Ultimately, authority and accountability 
cannot be reconciled.  At some point, greater accountability necessarily 
makes the decision-making process less efficient, while highly efficient 
decision-making structures necessarily entail nonreviewable discretion.  
This is so because, as Arrow observed, “If every decision of A is to be 
reviewed by B, then all we have really is a shift in the locus of authority 
from A to B and hence no solution to the original problem.”82 
Shareholder oversight of board decisions—whether through the vote or in 
courts—would effect just such a shift.  Such oversight necessarily 
contemplates outside review of management decisions, with shareholders or 
judges stepping in to make corrections and changes when management 
performance falters.  If shareholders could easily obtain such reviews, 
directors likely would be more accountable to them, but the board’s powers 
would become merely advisory rather than authoritative.  The efficient 
separation of ownership and control that makes the modern corporation 
possible thus is inconsistent with routine shareholder—or judicial—review 
of board decisions. 
The importance corporate law places on deference to the board’s 
authority is forcefully illustrated by the classic decision in Bayer v. Beran,83 
which held that the business judgment rule exists so as to “encourage 
freedom of action on the part of directors, or to put it another way, to 
 
team as a whole.  As such, shirking includes not only culpable cheating, but also negligence, 
oversight, incapacity, and even honest mistakes. Dooley, supra note 6, at 465. 
 79. The discussion herein of the tradeoff between authority and accountability again 
draws on earlier work. See Bainbridge, supra note 30, at 572–73. 
 80. See Dooley, supra note 6, at 463 (arguing that neither authority nor accountability 
standing alone “could provide a sensible guide to the governance of firm-organized 
economic activity because each seeks to achieve a distinct and separate value that is essential 
to the survival of any firm.  Accordingly, any feasible governance system must and does 
contain elements of both.”). 
 81. See id. at 471 (arguing that the business judgment rule reflects a tension between 
“conflicting values” that Dooley refers to as “[a]uthority” and “[r]esponsibility”). 
 82. ARROW, supra note 34, at 78. 
 83. 49 N.Y.S.2d 2 (Sup. Ct. 1944). 
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discourage interference with the exercise of their free and independent 
judgment.”84  Accordingly, business decisions are:  
[L]eft solely to [the directors’] honest and unselfish decision, for their 
powers therein are without limitation and free from restraint, and the 
exercise of them for the common and general interests of the corporation 
may not be questioned, although the results show that what they did was 
unwise or inexpedient.85   
At the same time, however, Bayer also recognized the key limitation on 
judicial deference to the board’s authority, in that “[t]he ‘business judgment 
rule’ . . . yields to the rule of undivided loyalty.  This great rule of law is 
designed ‘to avoid the possibility of fraud and to avoid the temptation of 
self-interest.’”86 
Where the directors’ decision is tainted by the potential for 
considerations other than shareholder wealth to drive their choice, as where 
the directors will be tempted to engage in self-dealing, the question is no 
longer one of honest error but of intentional misconduct.  The affirmative 
case for disregarding honest errors simply does not apply to intentional 
misconduct.87  To the contrary, given the potential for self-dealing in an 
organization characterized by a separation of ownership and control, the 
risk of legal liability may be a necessary deterrent against such 
misconduct.88  As former Delaware Chief Justice Veasey observed, 
“[I]nvestors do not want self-dealing directors or those bent on 
entrenchment in office. . . .  Trust of directors is the key because of the self-
governing nature of corporate law.  Yet the law is strong enough to rein in 
directors who would flirt with an abuse of that trust.”89 
The law is able to defer to most director decisions because agency costs 
are adequately constrained by market and other extralegal forces.  Although 
the partition admittedly is somewhat artificial, it is useful to begin the 
defense of that proposition with the distinction between judicial review of 
operational issues and structural choices, especially those creating a final 
period situation, such as takeovers.90 
Operational decisions appropriately receive much less probing review 
than do decisions relating to final period transactions.91  This is so because 
most operational decisions do not pose much of a conflict between the 
interests of directors and shareholders.  In game theory terminology, 
 
 84. Id. at 6. 
 85. Id. (quoting Pollitz v. Wabash R. Co., 100 N.E. 721, 724 (N.Y. 1912)). 
 86. Id. (quoting In re Ryan’s Will, 52 N.E.2d 909, 912 (N.Y. 1943)). 
 87. See STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOMICS 266–67 (2002) 
(discussing the differences between self-dealing and errors of judgment). 
 88. See id. at 306–07 (discussing the necessity for judicial review of loyalty issues). 
 89. E. Norman Veasey, An Economic Rationale for Judicial Decisionmaking in 
Corporate Law, 53 BUS. LAW. 681, 694 (1998). 
 90. See E. Norman Veasey, The Defining Tension in Corporate Governance in America, 
52 BUS. LAW. 393, 394 (1997) (drawing a similar distinction between “enterprise” and 
“ownership” decisions). 
 91. See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 87, at 284–86 (discussing precedents). 
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operational decisions take place in a board-shareholder relationship 
consisting of an ongoing series of repeat transactions.92  In repeat game 
settings, the actors’ decisions are constrained by the threat that cheating in 
one turn will be punished by the other party in future turns.  To be sure, 
shareholder discipline is not a very important check on directorial self-
dealing, for the reasons we have already discussed.93  Yet, shareholder 
voting is just one of an array of extrajudicial constraints that, in totality, 
incentivize directors to exercise reasonable care in decision making.  In 
particular, directors and managers are subject to important constraints 
imposed by the product and job markets.94  True, these constraining forces 
do not eliminate the possibility of director error.  The directors will still err 
from time to time.  That is precisely the sort of error, however, that the 
courts traditionally—and appropriately—eschew reviewing. 
In contrast, structural decisions—such as corporate takeovers—present a 
final period problem entailing an especially severe conflict of interest.  
Even so, however, in an arm’s-length merger, the board’s potential conflict 
of interest is again policed by a variety of extralegal constraints.  First, 
independent directors and shareholders must be persuaded to approve the 
transaction.95  Second, ill-advised acquisitions are likely to cause the 
acquiring firm problems in the capital markets, which may constrain its 
willingness to divert gains from target shareholders to the target’s board and 
managers.96 
Third, and even more important, negotiated acquisitions are subject to the 
constraining influences of the market for corporate control.  Where the 
target’s board accepts a low initial offer, a second bidder may succeed by 
offering shareholders a higher-priced alternative.97  Of course, the 
competing bidder’s transaction cannot be structured as a merger or asset 
sale if it is unable to persuade target management to change sides.  Even so, 
the intervener has a formidable alternative in the tender offer, which 
provides a safety valve by eliminating the need for target board cooperation 
 
 92. Id. 
 93. See supra notes 23–28 and accompanying text. 
 94. See Dynamics Corp. of Am. v. CTS Corp., 794 F.2d 250, 256 (7th Cir. 1986), rev’d 
on other grounds, 481 U.S. 69 (1987) (arguing that “competition in the product and labor 
markets and in the market for corporate control provides sufficient punishment for 
businessmen who commit more than their share of business mistakes”); Lisa M. Fairfax, 
Spare the Rod, Spoil the Director?  Revitalizing Directors’ Fiduciary Duty Through Legal 
Liability, 42 HOUS. L. REV. 393, 429 (2005) (“As members of these various communities, 
directors have strong incentives to perform their duties in a manner that does not damage 
their reputation within these communities.”). 
 95. Cf. Schoon v. Smith, 953 A.2d 196, 207 (Del. 2008) (“Independence means that a 
director’s decision is based on the corporate merits of the subject before the board rather 
than extraneous considerations or influences.”). 
 96. Cf. Mark L. Mitchell & Kenneth Lehn, Do Bad Bidders Become Good Targets?, 
98 J. POL. ECON. 372 (1990) (documenting that firms that overpay in acquisitions frequently 
become targets for other acquirers). 
 97. Cf. Heath Price Tarbert, Merger Breakup Fees:  A Critical Challenge to Anglo-
American Corporate Law, 34 LAW & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 627, 633 (2003) (explaining that 
“second bidders usually succeed”). 
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by permitting the bidder to buy a controlling share block directly from the 
stockholders.98 
In a hostile acquisition, the prospective acquirer must bypass the board 
from the outset.  In the absence of the poison pill or other takeover 
defenses, however, any conflicted interests on the part of target directors or 
managers are mitigated because shareholders are free to sell or not as they 
see fit.  Where the target deploys a pill or takes other defensive actions, 
those actions are inevitably tainted by the specter of self-interest.99  Unlike 
the negotiated takeover, moreover, there is no market safety valve.  It was 
precisely this policy concern that motivated the Delaware Supreme Court to 
adopt the more intrusive Unocal standard of review for dealing with 
defenses against unsolicited takeovers. 
D.  Unocal 
Target board resistance to an unsolicited takeover bid presented the 
Delaware Supreme Court with a difficult doctrinal choice.  Whether the 
problem is framed as a question of care or of loyalty has vital—indeed, 
potentially outcome determinative—consequences.100  If the court invoked 
the duty of loyalty, with its accompanying intrinsic fairness standard of 
review, the defendant directors would be required—subject to close and 
exacting judicial scrutiny—to establish that the transaction was objectively 
fair to the corporation.101  Because this burden is an exceedingly difficult 
one to bear, takeover defenses would rarely pass muster.102  Accordingly, a 
court should treat resistance to unsolicited takeovers as implicating the 
board’s duty of loyalty only if it concludes that takeover defenses are 
almost per se adverse to shareholder interests. 
On the other hand, if the court treated takeover defenses as a care 
question, plaintiff would have to rebut the business judgment rule’s 
presumptions by showing that the decision was tainted by fraud, illegality, 
 
 98. See supra notes 52–53 and accompanying text (explaining how a tender offer allows 
an acquirer to bypass the target’s board). 
 99. Dynamics Corp., 794 F.2d at 256 (“When managers are busy erecting obstacles to 
the taking over of the corporation by an investor who is likely to fire them if the takeover 
attempt succeeds, they have a clear conflict of interest, and it is not cured by vesting the 
power of decision in a board of directors in which insiders are a minority . . . .”). 
 100. See Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1279 (Del. 1988) 
(recognizing that the choice of duty of care versus duty of loyalty would be outcome 
determinative); AC Acquisitions Corp. v. Anderson, Clayton & Co., 519 A.2d 103, 111 (Del. 
Ch. 1986) (same). 
 101. See Robert M. Bass Grp., Inc. v. Evans, 552 A.2d 1227, 1239 (Del. Ch. 1988) 
(discussing the relevant standard of review); cf. Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 
722 (Del. 1971) (discussing the application of the intrinsic fairness standard to fiduciary 
duties of majority shareholders). 
 102. Cf. Nixon v. Blackwell, 626 A.2d 1366, 1376 (Del. 1993) (explaining that the 
court’s decision to apply entire fairness standard of review in cases implicating the duty of 
loyalty invokes a standard so exacting that it frequently, albeit not always, results in a 
finding of liability). 
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self-dealing, or some other exception to the rule.103  Absent the proverbial 
smoking gun, plaintiff is unlikely to prevail under this standard.104  A duty 
of care analysis thus makes sense only if one thinks management resistance 
to takeovers is almost always constrained so as to ameliorate the conflict of 
interest inherent therein. 
In Unocal, the Delaware Supreme Court attempted to steer a middle 
course by promulgating what has been called an “intermediate” or 
“enhanced business judgment” standard of judicial review, but is perhaps 
best described as a “conditional business judgment rule.”105  In Unocal, 
famed corporate raider T. Boone Pickens’s Mesa Petroleum Company, 
whom the court referred to as having “a national reputation as a 
‘greenmailer,’”106 made an unsolicited, structurally coercive two-tier 
takeover bid for Unocal.107  In response, Unocal’s board of directors 
authorized the company to make a discriminatory self-tender offer for its 
own stock.108  Mesa sued, arguing that Unocal’s board of directors had 
breached its fiduciary duties. 
 
 103. See Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984) (stating that the business 
judgment rule “is a presumption that in making a business decision the directors of a 
corporation acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that the action 
taken was in the best interests of the company”). 
 104. See Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 885 (2d Cir. 1982) (“[T]he fact is that liability is 
rarely imposed upon corporate directors or officers simply for bad judgment and this 
reluctance to impose liability for unsuccessful business decisions has been doctrinally 
labeled the business judgment rule.”), cert. denied sub nom. Citytrust v. Joy, 460 U.S. 1051 
(1983). 
 105. DOOLEY, supra note 25, at 547. 
 106. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 956 (Del. 1985). 
 107. Pickens initially acquired 13 percent of Unocal’s voting stock through his main 
corporate vehicle, Mesa Petroleum. Id. at 949.  Mesa thereafter launched what the court 
called “a two-tier ‘front loaded’ cash tender offer for 64 million shares, or approximately 37 
percent, of Unocal’s outstanding stock at a price of $54 per share.” Id.  If that offer 
succeeded, the second-tier transaction would consist of a freeze-out merger to eliminate the 
remaining shares, in which the consideration would be junk bonds ostensibly worth $54 per 
Unocal share. See id. (describing the “back-end” transaction). 
  Mesa’s offer is now regarded as being “structurally coercive.” Ronald J. Gilson & 
Reinier Kraakman, Delaware’s Intermediate Standard for Defensive Tactics:  Is There 
Substance to Proportionality Review?, 44 BUS. LAW. 247, 259 (1989).  To simplify the 
problem, suppose Target’s pre-bid stock price was $50.  Bidder 1 makes a two-tier offer with 
differing prices:  $80 cash in the first-step tender offer and $60 cash in the second step 
freeze-out merger.  Assuming the first-step tender offer seeks 50 percent of the shares plus 
one, the blended offer price is $70 with a blended premium of $20 per share (calculated by 
taking the weighted average of the two steps).  Bidder 2 offers $75 in cash for any and all 
shares tendered, a premium of $25 per share.  As a group, shareholders are better off with 
Bidder 2.  Yet, Bidder 1’s offer creates a prisoners’ dilemma.  Those shareholders who 
“cheat,” by taking Bidder 1’s front-end offer, end up with $80 rather than $75.  With a large 
noncohesive group in which defectors bear no cost—such as shame or reprisals—rational 
investors should defect.  Because everyone’s individual incentive is to defect, the 
shareholders end up with the offer that is worst for the group.  Mesa’s offer differed from 
this example by offering the same price in both steps, but the far less attractive form of 
consideration to be paid in the second step would have similarly coercive effects. 
 108. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 951. The offer was discriminatory because Pickens could not 
tender into it. Id.  Under Unocal’s counter offer, if Mesa’s front-end tender offer succeeded 
in giving Mesa a majority of Unocal’s stock, Unocal would repurchase the remaining 
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In rejecting Mesa’s claims, the Delaware Supreme Court reaffirmed the 
target board’s general decision-making primacy, while also reaffirming the 
board’s obligation to determine whether the offer is in the best interests of 
the shareholders.109  In light of the board’s potential conflict of interest vis-
à-vis the shareholders, however, judicial review was to be somewhat more 
intrusive than under the traditional business judgment rule.110 
Unocal thus affirmed that the target board of directors has not just the 
power but also the “fiduciary duty to act in the best interests of the 
corporation’s stockholders,” which sometimes may include resistance to an 
unsolicited takeover bid.111  The board’s powers in this regard, however, 
“are not absolute.”112  Accordingly, the target’s board “does not have 
unbridled discretion to defeat any perceived threat by any Draconian means 
available.”113 
The initial burden of proof is on the target’s board of directors, which 
must show that they had reasonable grounds for believing that a danger to 
corporate policy or effectiveness was posed by the unsolicited takeover 
bid.114  The board satisfies that burden “by showing good faith and 
reasonable investigation.”115 
Assuming the directors carry this initial burden, they next must prove 
that the defense was “reasonable in relationship to the threat posed” by the 
 
minority shares with debt securities worth $72. Id.  It would leave the company drained of 
significant assets and burdened by substantial debt, albeit still “a viable entity.” Id. at 950. 
 109. See id. at 954 (“When a board addresses a pending takeover bid it has an obligation 
to determine whether the offer is in the best interests of the corporation and its 
shareholders.”). 
 110. Id.  (“Because of the omnipresent specter that a board may be acting primarily in its 
own interests, rather than those of the corporation and its shareholders, there is an enhanced 
duty which calls for judicial examination at the threshold before the protections of the 
business judgment rule may be conferred.”). 
 111. Id. at 955; see also Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1152 
(Del. 1989) (“We have repeatedly stated that the refusal to entertain an offer may comport 
with a valid exercise of a board’s business judgment.”). 
 112. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. (“In the face of this inherent conflict directors must show that they had 
reasonable grounds for believing that a danger to corporate policy and effectiveness existed 
because of another person’s stock ownership.”).  In addition, Unocal requires proof that the 
target’s board of directors had the authority under the governing statutes and the 
corporation’s organic documents to take the specific action in question. Moran v. Household 
Int’l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346, 1350–51 (Del. 1985). 
 115. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955 (quoting Cheff v. Mathes, 199 A.2d 548, 555 (Del. 1964)).  
This standard requires, inter alia, a showing that the directors acted in response to a 
perceived threat to the corporation and not for the purpose of entrenching themselves in 
office. See id. (holding that the target board must show that it “had reasonable grounds for 
believing that a danger to corporate policy and effectiveness existed”).  The reasonable 
investigation element requires a demonstration that the board was adequately informed, with 
the relevant standard being one of gross negligence. See CRTF Corp. v. Federated Dep’t 
Stores, Inc., 683 F. Supp. 422, 437 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (interpreting Delaware precedents to 
require the court to “consider whether the Board made an ‘informed’ decision based on 
reasonable investigation, considered under a standard of gross negligence”). 
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hostile bid.116  If the directors meet this two-step burden, the business 
judgment rule applies, but if the directors fail to carry their initial burden, 
the duty of loyalty’s intrinsic fairness test applies.117 
E.  Evaluating Unocal 
Many academic commentators have argued that target directors should 
have a modest gatekeeping role—if any—in unsolicited takeovers.  
Professors Frank Easterbrook and Daniel Fischel, for example, went to the 
extreme of proposing that complete passivity should be required of 
incumbent directors and managers of a target company in the face of an 
unsolicited offer.118  In Unocal, however, the Delaware Supreme Court 
explicitly rejected Easterbrook and Fischel’s passivity approach.119 
Given the Delaware courts’ “normal sensitivity to conflicts of interest”120 
and the undeniable fact that a passivity rule would do a more thorough job 
of constraining the board’s conflicted interests than does Unocal, is it 
surprising Delaware courts rejected passivity and adopted a standard 
permitting target resistance?121  Analysis should begin with the proposition 
that all doctrinal responses to corporate conflict of interest transactions have 
two features in common.  First, so long as the board of directors is 
disinterested and independent, it retains full decision-making authority with 
respect to the transaction.122  Second, the board’s independence and 
 
 116. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955.  Note that both the decision to adopt and any subsequent 
decision to implement a set of takeover defenses are subject to challenge and judicial review. 
See Moran, 500 A.2d at 1354.  In Moran v. Household Int’l, Inc., plaintiffs sued when the 
target first adopted a poison pill, before any takeover bid had been made.  The court upheld 
the pill as valid, but explained: 
  When the Household Board of Directors is faced with a tender offer and a 
request to redeem the [pill], they will not be able to arbitrarily reject the offer. 
They will be held to the same fiduciary standards any other board of directors 
would be held to in deciding to adopt a defensive mechanism, the same standard as 
they were held to in originally approving the [pill]. 
Id. at 1354.  In Hills Stores Co. v. Bozic, 769 A.2d 88 (Del. Ch. 2000), the chancery court 
explained that: 
  Delaware case law has assured stockholders that the fact that the court has 
approved a board’s decision to put defenses in place on a clear day does not mean 
that the board will escape its burden to justify its use of those defenses in the heat 
of battle under the Unocal standard. 
Id. at 106–07. 
 117. See Shamrock Holdings, Inc. v. Polaroid Corp., 559 A.2d 257, 271 (Del. Ch. 1989). 
 118. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Auctions and Sunk Costs in 
Tender Offers, 35 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1982); Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 71.  For a 
critique of Easterbrook and Fischel’s argument that takeovers have systemic effects 
generating social welfare from both ex ante and ex post perspectives, see BAINBRIDGE, supra 
note 87, at 697–700, 715–18. 
 119. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955 n.10 (noting academic suggestions that “a board’s response 
to a takeover threat should be a passive one,” the court opined that “that clearly is not the 
law of Delaware”). 
 120. Dooley, supra note 6, at 515. 
 121. See id. (noting that “many have been perplexed and some dismayed by the 
[Delaware] courts’ refusal to ban or at least severely limit target board resistance”). 
 122. See id. at 488. 
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decision-making process is subject to judicial scrutiny.123  Corporate law 
thus neither prohibits transactions nor requires complete board passivity in 
connection with them simply because they potentially involve conflicts of 
interest.  Instead, it regulates them in ways designed to constrain self-
interested behavior.  Unocal simply brought these well-established rules to 
bear on the conflicts of interest created by target resistance to unsolicited 
offers.124  Unless one believes that the conflict of interest inherent when 
boards choose to resist an unsolicited offer differs in kind rather than just 
degree from other conflicted interests, there was no need to develop a 
radically different set of rules to deal with such resistance.125 
II.  REVLON AND PROGENY 
In Revlon, the Delaware Supreme Court was obliged to determine 
whether the Unocal standard applied to so-called deal protection devices.  
These corporate finance tools come into play in two basic situations.  First, 
they may be used in a negotiated acquisition to deter competitive bids.126  
Second, in corporate control contests, such as the one that took place in 
Revlon, they may be used to ensure that a white knight prevails over the 
hostile bidder.127 
A.  Revlon 
In response to an unsolicited tender offer by Pantry Pride, Revlon’s board 
undertook a variety of defensive measures, including a variant on a poison 
pill.128  When Pantry Pride responded not by giving up on its effort to 
acquire Revlon, but by increasing the price per share it was prepared to 
offer, Revlon’s board responded by authorizing management to pursue 
negotiations with other prospective bidders.129  The search for a white 
knight culminated in an agreement between Revlon and leveraged buyout-
 
 123. See id. at 488–90. 
 124. The point is well illustrated by the Delaware Supreme Court’s decision in Williams 
v. Geier, 671 A.2d 1368 (Del. 1996), in which an antitakeover dual class stock plan received 
approval by the disinterested shareholders.  In light of the shareholder action, the court held 
that the Unocal standard was “inapplicable here because there was no unilateral board 
action.” Id. at 1377.  In other words, as with all other conflicted-interest transactions, 
shareholder approval provides substantial protection from judicial review for the board’s 
decision, which in turn confirms that Unocal can be situated in Delaware’s set of conflict of 
interest doctrines. 
 125. For an argument that the conflict of interest created by resistance to an unsolicited 
offer does not differ in kind from other conflicted-interest transactions, see BAINBRIDGE, 
supra note 87, at 712–15. 
 126. See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 87, at 349–51 (discussing exclusivity provisions). 
 127. See id. at 385–86 (discussing the use of lockup options to deter or end competitive 
bidding).  “In corporation law parlance, a ‘white knight’ is a friendly alternative partner who 
rescues the target company from the purported clutches of a hostile bidder.” Gilbert v. El 
Paso Co., 575 A.2d 1131, 1136 n.12 (Del. 1990). 
 128. See Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 180 (1986) 
(discussing Revlon’s “first relevant defensive measure . . . , which would be considered a 
‘poison pill’”). 
 129. Id. at 182. 
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specialist Forstmann Little, which included a lockup arrangement, as well 
as other measures designed to prevent Pantry Pride’s bid from prevailing.130 
The Delaware Supreme Court reviewed (and upheld) Revlon’s initial 
defensive tactics using standard Unocal analysis.131  In turning to the 
lockup arrangement, however, the court struck out in a new direction: 
The Revlon board’s authorization permitting management to negotiate a 
merger or buyout with a third party was a recognition that the company 
was for sale.  The duty of the board had thus changed from the 
preservation of Revlon as a corporate entity to the maximization of the 
company’s value at a sale for the stockholders’ benefit.  This significantly 
altered the board’s responsibilities under the Unocal standards.  It no 
longer faced threats to corporate policy and effectiveness, or to the 
stockholders’ interests, from a grossly inadequate bid.  The whole 
question of defensive measures became moot.  The directors’ role 
changed from defenders of the corporate bastion to auctioneers charged 
with getting the best price for the stockholders at a sale of the 
company.132 
 
 130. See id. at 175 (describing exclusivity terms in the Revlon-Forstmann agreement).  
Broadly defined, the term “lock up” includes any agreement between a target and a 
prospective acquirer intended to prevent or end competitive bidding. Bainbridge, supra note 
48, at 250.  More commonly, however, the term is used to refer to so-called “lock-up 
options,” which consist of agreements granting a prospective acquirer an option to buy 
shares or assets of the target. Id. 
  In Revlon, the agreement in question was a lockup option pursuant to which 
Forstmann would be entitled “to purchase Revlon’s Vision Care and National Health 
Laboratories divisions for $525 million, some $100–$175 million below the value ascribed 
to them by Lazard Freres, if another acquiror got 40% of Revlon’s shares.” Revlon, 506 A.2d 
at 178.  In Revlon, the lockup’s deterrent effect thus consisted of the substantial discount 
Forstmann would receive.  In most cases, however, the lockup’s deterrent effect arises 
because “the subject of the option is usually either the assets most desired by a competing 
bidder or those essential to the target’s operations.” Bainbridge, supra note 48, at 251.  
Accordingly, asset lockup options are also known as “crown jewel options,” because the 
asset subject to the option is the target’s most valuable or desirable asset. Id. 
  Stock lockups consist of agreements by which the target gives a favored bidder an 
option to purchase authorized but unissued target shares. Id. at 250.  The risk that the option 
will be exercised, thereby driving up the number of shares that must be acquired in order to 
obtain control and thus increasing the overall acquisition cost, is intended to deter competing 
bids. Id. at 250–51.  In addition, if the option is exercised prior to the shareholder vote on the 
merger agreement, the favored bidder can vote the additional shares in favor of the merger, 
helping to assure that the requisite approval will be obtained. Id. at 251. Finally, if a 
competing bidder emerges and prevails, “the favored bidder can exercise the option and sell 
the additional shares on the open market or tender them to the successful bidder, thereby” at 
least recouping some of the costs incurred in the losing acquisition effort. Id. 
  Lock-up options find use in both negotiated and hostile acquisitions.  In the former 
case, they are a powerful supplement to exclusive merger agreements, both deterring 
competitive bidding and pressuring shareholders to approve the favored bidder transaction. 
See id. at 287–89 (discussing coercive effects of lockup options).  In the latter, they can be 
used to end competitive bidding by locking up the deal for the favored bidder. See Revlon, 
506 A.2d at 183 (noting that lock ups can “end an active auction and foreclose further 
bidding”). 
 131. See Revlon, 506 A.2d at 180–81 (discussing Unocal’s application to Revlon’s initial 
defensive moves). 
 132. Id. at 182. 
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Because the lockup ended the auction in return for minimal improvement in 
the final offer, it was invalidated.133 
B.  Initial Progeny 
Thus was born the jurisprudential territory that came to be known as 
Revlon-land.  Finding one’s way around it proved surprisingly troublesome.  
For example, did Revlon establish special duties to govern control auctions, 
or are the so-called “Revlon duties” really just the general Unocal rules 
applied to a special fact situation?  The courts waffled on this issue, 
although the latter interpretation ultimately prevailed.134 
Whether the Revlon duties are distinct or just a subset of Unocal does not 
address what exactly directors are supposed to do once their role changes 
from “defenders of the corporate bastion to auctioneers.”  Prior to the 
pivotal Paramount decisions discussed below,135 a few things seemingly 
could be said with confidence.  It was clear, for example, that target 
directors need not be passive observers of market competition.136  The 
board’s objective, however, “must remain the enhancement of the bidding 
process for the benefit of the stockholders.”137 
Finally, when did directors stop being “defenders of the corporate 
bastion” and become “auctioneers”?  Again, prior to the Paramount 
decisions, it seemed well settled that the auctioneering duty is triggered 
when (but apparently only when) a proposed transaction would result in a 
change of control of the target corporation.  For example, if a defensive 
recapitalization, which most of these cases involved, transferred effective 
voting control to target management or some other identifiable control 
block, the courts treated the transaction as a “change in control” of the 
corporation requiring adherence to Revlon’s auction rule.138  If no 
 
 133. See id. at 183–84 (discussing the lockup’s impermissible “destructive effect on the 
auction process . . . in return for very little actual improvement in the final bid”). 
 134. In 1987, for example, the Delaware Supreme Court drew a rather sharp distinction 
between the Unocal standard and what it then called “the Revlon obligation to conduct a sale 
of the corporation.” Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining Corp., 535 A.2d 1334, 1338 (Del. 
1987). Two years later, however, the court indicated that Revlon is “merely one of an 
unbroken line of cases that seek to prevent the conflicts of interest that arise in the field of 
mergers and acquisitions by demanding that directors act with scrupulous concern for 
fairness to shareholders.” Barkan v. Amsted Indus., Inc., 567 A.2d 1279, 1286 (Del. 1989). 
 135. See infra Part II.C. 
 136. CRFT Corp. v. Federated Dep’t Stores, Inc., 683 F. Supp. 422, 441 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) 
(applying Delaware law). 
 137. Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1287 (Del. 1989).  
Directors did not need to blindly focus on price to the exclusion of other relevant factors. See 
Cottle v. Storer Commc’n, Inc., 849 F.2d 570, 577 (11th Cir. 1988). The board could 
evaluate offers on such grounds as the proposed form of consideration, tax consequences, 
firmness of financing, antitrust or other regulatory obstacles, and timing. Id. 
 138. See Mills Acquisition Co., 559 A.2d at 1285 (holding that the requisite “sale” could 
take “the form of an active auction, a management buyout, or a ‘restructuring’”); see also 
Robert M. Bass Grp., Inc. v. Evans, 552 A.2d 1227, 1243 (Del. Ch. 1988); cf. Black & 
Decker Corp. v. Am. Standard, Inc., 682 F. Supp. 772, 781 (D. Del. 1988) (reading Delaware 
law to require the directors of a company to maximize the amount received by shareholders 
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identifiable control block formed (or changed hands), however, defensive 
measures were subject solely to standard Unocal review.139 
C.  Paramount Law 
The evolution of the Revlon doctrine—and that of Unocal, for that 
matter—took major leaps in a pair of cases involving Paramount 
Communications.  Taken together, they laid out a basic geography of 
Revlon-land that persists to this day.  They also confirm that analysis of the 
board’s motives remains a critical guide to application of Revlon to specific 
cases. 
1.  Time-Warner 
In the first of these cases, Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time 
Inc.,140 the Delaware courts refereed a takeover struggle between Time, 
Warner Communications, and Paramount.  The back story to this clash of 
media titans opened with Time’s board of directors approving a 
management-developed long-term strategic plan to address the changing 
environment facing the publishing and entertainment industries.141  The 
plan included a recommendation that Time seek a business combination 
with Warner Communications.  Following negotiations between the two 
companies’ respective managements, Time’s board of directors approved a 
merger with Warner in which former Warner shareholders would receive 
newly issued Time shares representing approximately 62 percent of the 
shares of the combined entity.  As was typical in negotiated acquisitions in 
that era, the parties also sought “to discourage any effort to upset the 
transaction” by agreeing to a lockup option giving each party the option to 
trigger an exchange of shares.142  In addition, the merger agreement 
included a no-shop clause, supplemented by commitments from various 
banks that they would not finance a takeover bid for Time.143 
 
once it is clear to them that the “corporation is to be subject to a change in control” (quoting 
Freedman v. Rest. Assocs., 1987 WL 14323, at *661 (Del. Ch. Oct. 16, 1987))); Ivanhoe 
Partners, 535 A.2d at 1345 (noting that Revlon was not triggered where the management ally 
had less than 50 percent voting control after defensive recapitalization). 
 139. See Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. Time Inc., 1989 WL 79880, at *22 (Del. Ch. July 
14, 1989) (“Clearly not every offer or transaction affecting the corporate structure invokes 
the Revlon duties.”), aff’d on other grounds, 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989). 
 140. 1989 WL 79880 (Del. Ch. July 14, 1989), aff’d, 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989). 
 141. Time, 571 A.2d at 1144. 
 142. Time, 1989 WL 79880, at *9. 
 143. Id. at *10.  No-shop clauses are merger agreement provisions intended to discourage 
competitive bids for the target from other offerors by prohibiting the target from soliciting 
any such competing offer. See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 1, at 350 (describing such clauses).  
Basic no-shop clauses do, however, permit the target’s board of directors to consider an 
unsolicited bid and, if such an unsolicited offer is made, to negotiate with the new bidder. 
See id. (discussing relevant provisions).  In contrast, a no negotiation covenant prohibits the 
target from entering into negotiations with a competing bidder making an unsolicited offer. 
See id. (discussing relevant provisions).  An intermediary variant, the no-merger clause, 
permits the target to negotiate with a prospective competing offeror, but prohibits it from 
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Shortly before Time’s shareholders were to vote on the merger plan, 
Paramount made a cash tender offer of $175 per share for Time, 
conditioned, inter alia, on termination of the Time-Warner merger 
agreement.144  Time’s board rejected the offer as inadequate, without 
entering into communications with Paramount.145  To forestall Paramount 
from going forward with a hostile tender offer, the Time and Warner boards 
then agreed to a new structure for the transaction, under which Time would 
make a cash tender offer for a majority block of Warner shares to be 
followed by a freeze-out merger in which the remaining Warner shares 
would be acquired.146  This structure had the advantage of eliminating any 
need for approval of the transaction by Time’s shareholders, which was 
deemed essential because a substantial majority of Time’s shares were now 
held by arbitragers and institutional investors considered likely to favor the 
Paramount offer and who were therefore expected to vote against the 
merger with Warner if given the opportunity to do so.147  If the revised plan 
succeeded, Time’s shareholders therefore would end up as minority 
shareholders in a company saddled with substantial debt and whose stock 
price almost certainly would be lower in the short run than the Paramount 
offer.148 
a.  Why Not Let the Shareholders Decide? 
The substantial differences in shareholder wealth likely to result from a 
decision to merge with Warner rather than to sell to Paramount forcefully 
presented the question of who should make that decision.149  Paramount 
naturally insisted that Time’s board had an obligation to give the 
“shareholders the power and opportunity to designate whether the company 
should now be sold.”150  Chancellor Allen, however, squarely rejected that 
proposition, holding that “the financial vitality of the corporation and the 
value of the company’s shares is in the hands of the directors and managers 
 
entering into a merger agreement with the second bidder until the initial bid has been voted 
on by the target’s shareholders. See id. (discussing relevant provisions). 
 144. Time, 1989 WL 79880, at *10. 
 145. See id. at *11 (describing the reaction of Time’s board).  The no-shop clause in the 
Time-Warner merger agreement contained an exception permitting Time to “communicate” 
with a competing offeror, after consultation with Warner, in the event “a hostile tender offer 
for 25% or more of Time’s stock [was] announced (or 10% of its stock [was] purchased).”). 
Id. 
 146. See Time, 571 A.2d at 1148 (describing the terms of the revised deal). 
 147. See Time, 1989 WL 79880, at *14 (noting that “most such money managers would 
be tempted by the cash now”). 
 148. Among other things, the new plan required Time to incur between seven and ten 
billion dollars in additional debt. See Time, 571 A.2d at 1148 (describing the effects of the 
revised deal). 
 149. As Chancellor Allen put it, the “overarching question is where legally (an easy 
question) and equitably (more subtle problem) the locus of decision-making power does or 
should reside in circumstances of this kind.” Time, 1989 WL 79880, at *20. 
 150. Id. 
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of the firm.”151  Accordingly, Allen squarely rejected the argument “that 
directors, in exercising their powers to manage the firm, are obligated to 
follow the wishes of a majority of shares.”152  The Delaware Supreme 
Court explicitly endorsed Allen’s analysis.153 
Time thus implicitly rejects the argument that a shareholder’s decision to 
tender his shares to the bidder no more concerns the institutional 
responsibilities or prerogatives of the board than would the shareholder’s 
decision to sell his shares on the open market or, for that matter, to sell his 
house.154  Time was correct to do so, because none of the normative bases 
for the contrary argument prove persuasive.  That shareholders have the 
right to make the final decision about an unsolicited tender offer does not 
necessarily follow, for example, from the mere fact that shareholders have 
voting rights.155 
Likewise, a right for shareholders to choose between competing offers is 
not a necessary corollary of the shareholders’ ownership of the corporation.  
A shareholder’s right to dispose of his stock is not a species of private 
property, but rather arises out of the contract established by the firm’s 
organic documents and the state of incorporation’s corporate statute and 
common law.156  As Vice Chancellor Walsh observed of that contract, 
“shareholders do not possess a contractual right to receive takeover bids.  
The shareholders’ ability to gain premiums through takeover activity is 
subject to the good faith business judgment of the board of directors in 
structuring defensive tactics.”157 
b.  The Emergence of Motive As the Determinative Factor 
Because shareholder choice has little independent normative significance, 
if any, the real question was whether the Time board’s foreclosing of 
shareholder choice was based on proper or improper motives.  In other 
 
 151. Id. at *30. 
 152. Id. 
 153. Time, 571 A.2d at 1153–54 (explaining that courts should not substitute their 
judgment for that of the board). 
 154. See, e.g., Dynamics Corp. of Am. v. CTS Corp., 794 F.2d 250, 254 (7th Cir. 1986) 
(advancing that argument), rev’d on other grounds, 481 U.S. 69 (1987); Hanson Trust PLC 
v. ML SCM Acquisition Inc., 781 F.2d 264, 282 (2d Cir. 1986) (same); Norlin Corp. v. 
Rooney, Pace Inc., 744 F.2d 255, 258 (2d Cir. 1984) (same). 
 155. See TW Servs., Inc. v. SWT Acquisition Corp., 1989 WL 20290, at *8 n.14 (Del. 
Ch. Mar. 2, 1989) (“While corporate democracy is a pertinent concept, a corporation is not a 
New England town meeting; directors, not shareholders, have responsibilities to manage the 
business and affairs of the corporation, subject however to a fiduciary obligation.”). 
 156. See, e.g., New Orleans Opera Ass’n v. S. Reg’l Opera Endowment Fund, 993 So. 2d 
791, 797–98 (La. Ct. App. 2008) (“A corporate charter or articles of incorporation are a 
contract between the corporation and its shareholders and forms a contractual relationship 
between the shareholders themselves, which sets forth rights, obligations and liabilities . . . .  
A corporation is in law a contractual creature, a nexus of contracts.” (citations and internal 
quotation marks omitted)). 
 157. Moran v. Household Int’l, Inc., 490 A.2d 1059, 1070 (Del. Ch.), aff’d, 500 A.2d 
1346 (Del. 1985). 
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words, did the board exercise its prerogative in ways suggesting that the 
transaction was driven by management self-interest?  This is so because it 
had become increasingly clear that the Delaware courts were—albeit sub 
silentio—varying the standard of review according to the likelihood that the 
actions of the board or managers were tainted by conflicted interests in a 
particular transactional setting and the likelihood that nonlegal forces 
effectively constrained those conflicted interests in that setting.  In other 
words, the target board’s motives had emerged as a crucial—if not 
determinative—factor in the analysis.158 
As former Delaware Chancellor Allen explained in the closely related 
context of management buyout transactions, “The court’s own implicit 
evaluation of the integrity of the . . . process marks that process as 
deserving respect or condemns it to be ignored.”159  Assuming that a special 
committee of independent directors would be appointed to consider the 
proposed transaction, Allen went on to explain: 
 When a special committee’s process is perceived as reflecting a good 
faith, informed attempt to approximate aggressive, arms-length 
bargaining, it will be accorded substantial importance by the court.  
When, on the other hand, it appears as artifice, ruse or charade, or when 
the board unduly limits the committee or when the committee fails to 
correctly perceive its mission—then one can expect that its decision will 
be accorded no respect.160 
There is considerable evidence that the same emphasis on conflicted 
interests and motives underlies much of the Unocal and Revlon analysis.  
Former Delaware Supreme Court Justice Moore argued, for example, that 
during his tenure on the court he and his colleagues focused on the question 
of “whether the directors acted properly in accepting or rejecting the 
competing offers,” even if hindsight demonstrated that that decision turned 
out “to be wrong.”161  A federal court similarly described the Unocal 
standard as asking “whether a fully informed, wholly disinterested, 
reasonably courageous director would dissent from the board’s act in any 
material part.”162 
Motive is the consistent theme throughout these summations of Delaware 
law.  Accordingly, in many cases it appeared that, if the conflict of interest 
inherent in target board actions in cases governed by those standards had 
matured into actual self-dealing, the court would invalidate the defensive 
 
 158. See generally Dooley, supra note 6, at 517–24 (discussing the significance of board 
motives in Delaware’s takeover jurisprudence). 
 159. William T. Allen, Independent Directors in MBO Transactions:  Are They Fact or 
Fantasy?, 45 BUS. LAW. 2055, 2060 (1990). 
 160. Id. 
 161. Andrew G.T. Moore, II, The 1980s—Did We Save the Stockholders While the 
Corporation Burned?, 70 WASH. U. L.Q. 277, 287–89 (1992). 
 162. Southdown, Inc. v. Moore McCormack Res., Inc., 686 F. Supp. 595, 602 (S.D. Tex. 
1988). 
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tactics.  If the board acted from proper motives, even if mistakenly, 
however, the court would leave the defenses in place.163 
We see a similar emphasis on motive in cases involving corporate control 
auctions subject to Revlon.  As the Eleventh Circuit has noted, all corporate 
control “auctions must end sometime, and lockups by definition must 
discourage other bidders.”164  In assessing the validity of lockups and 
related devices, the proper questions thus are “whether [the target] 
conducted a fair auction, and whether [the favored bidder] made the best 
offer.”165  If those questions can be answered in the affirmative, the court 
has objective evidence that the board acted from proper motives even 
though its actions effectively precluded anyone other than the favored 
bidder from acquiring the company.166 
c.  How Time Policed the Board’s Conflict of Interest 
Time’s initial decision to merge with Warner was made by a board 
comprised principally of outsiders with no readily apparent conflicts of 
interest.  Once the Paramount bid emerged, however, the directors 
 
 163. See, for example, Henley Group, Inc. v. Santa Fe Southern Pacific Corp., 1988 WL 
23945 (Del. Ch. Apr. 12, 1988), in which the defendant corporation adopted a poison debt 
plan pursuant to which pay-in-kind debentures were distributed to the company’s 
shareholders as part of a restructuring. Id. at *6.  A variety of antitakeover provisions were 
built into the debentures, making the company a much less attractive takeover candidate. See 
id. at *7 (summarizing the plaintiff’s allegations).  Vice Chancellor Jacobs, however, 
deemed the debentures to be valid under Unocal. See id. at 14–16 (discussing Unocal 
issues).  The Vice Chancellor’s conclusion was driven in large part by the board of directors’ 
“diligent efforts” to sell the company prior to embarking upon the restructuring. Id. at 14.  
Those efforts “deprive[d] the plaintiffs’ argument—that the defendants were motivated to 
entrench themselves—of its force.” Id. 
  Other examples of the outcome-determinative nature of motive include:  Gilbert v. 
El Paso Co., 575 A.2d 1131, 1146 (Del. 1990) (upholding the settlement of a hostile 
takeover contest because “there is not a scintilla of evidence to intimate that this arrangement 
was the result of improper motives” on the board’s part); Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont 
Mining Corp., 535 A.2d 1334, 1344 (Del. 1987) (upholding defensive tactics because the 
“board acted to maintain the company’s independence and not merely to preserve its own 
control”); Henley Grp., Inc. v. Santa Fe S. Pac. Corp., 1988 WL 23945 (Del. Ch. Apr. 12, 
1988) (upholding a corporate restructuring where the board’s “diligent efforts” to sell the 
company before embarking on the restructuring “deprive[d] the plaintiffs’ argument—that 
the defendants were motivated to entrench themselves—of its force.”); Freedman v. Rest. 
Assocs. Indus., [1987–1988 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 93,502 (Del. Ch. 
1987) (holding that a board committee’s handling of a management-led leveraged buyout 
proposal would be reviewed under the business judgment rule because the plaintiffs had 
“failed utterly to offer any legal justification for the court’s second-guessing the decision of 
the special committee.”). 
 164. Cottle v. Storer Commc’n, Inc., 849 F.2d 570, 576 (11th Cir. 1988) (citations 
omitted). 
 165. Id. 
 166. Indeed, Revlon itself can be seen as a case in which the board’s actions strongly 
suggest self-interest.  Why would an auctioneer approve a transaction other than the highest 
bid if not for improper motives, at least assuming the competing proposals are identical in all 
respects other than price?  In fact, it appears that Revlon’s directors were mainly concerned 
with protecting themselves from litigation by the company’s debt holders. See Revlon, Inc. 
v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986). 
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undertook a drastic course of action whose sole purpose was preventing 
their shareholders from accepting Paramount’s offer.  As suggested by the 
analysis in the preceding section, this attempt to foreclose shareholder 
choice without first conducting a fair competition for control posed 
heightened accountability concerns because it provides circumstantial 
evidence from which one might reasonably infer the presence of self-
interested decision making. 
Consistent with the analysis offered in the preceding section, the Time 
courts chose differing standards of review reflecting the differing conflicts 
posed by the various challenged board actions.  The Time board’s initial 
decision to merge with Warner was protected by the business judgment 
rule.167  In contrast, the lockup, the decision to recast the transaction as a 
tender offer for Warner, and the various other measures undertaken to stave 
off Paramount’s competing bid involved a conflict of interest sufficiently 
severe to require application of a more exacting standard of review.168  The 
preliminary question, however, was whether Unocal or Revlon provided the 
applicable standard. 
d.  Time and Paramount Meet in Revlon-land 
For somewhat different reasons both Chancellor Allen and the Delaware 
Supreme Court concluded that Revlon had been not triggered.  Chancellor 
Allen followed a line of chancery court cases holding that Revlon applied to 
any transaction constituting a change in control,169 but he determined that 
the Time-Warner merger agreement would not result in a transfer of control 
because control of the combined entity remained “in a large, fluid, 
changeable and changing market.”170 
Although the Delaware Supreme Court indicated Allen’s analysis was 
correct “as a matter of law,” it rejected plaintiff’s Revlon claims on 
“different grounds”171: 
 Under Delaware law there are, generally speaking and without 
excluding other possibilities, two circumstances which may implicate 
Revlon duties.  The first, and clearer one, is when a corporation initiates 
an active bidding process seeking to sell itself or to effect a business 
reorganization involving a clear break-up of the company.  However, 
Revlon duties may also be triggered where, in response to a bidder’s offer, 
a target abandons its long-term strategy and seeks an alternative 
transaction involving the breakup of the company.172 
 
 167. Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1142 (Del. 1989). 
 168. See id. at 1152 (noting that “the revised agreement was defense-motivated”). 
 169. See supra notes 138–39 and accompanying text (discussing relevant precedents).  
The analysis in this section borrows in part from BAINBRIDGE, supra note 1, at 393–400. 
 170. Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. Time Inc., 1989 WL 79880, at *23 (Del. Ch. July 14, 
1989). 
 171. Time, 571 A.2d at 1150. 
 172. Id. 
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This passage is not a model of clarity.  What are the other nonexcluded 
possibilities?  How do the first and second identified possibilities differ?  If 
the court was deciding the case on broader grounds than Allen, can change 
of control transactions not involving a breakup of the company still trigger 
Revlon?  In particular, does Revlon apply when the target “initiates an 
active auction process seeking to sell itself,” but the auction participants do 
not contemplate breaking up the company?  Indeed, what exactly does the 
court mean by a “breakup of the company”?  What does seem clear, 
however, is that the Delaware Supreme Court intended to ensure that 
Revlon did not swallow the field of takeover litigation.173 
To be sure, Time did not leave the lockup and other bid-preclusive 
measures immune from challenge.  Instead, the lockup and Time’s 
subsequent recasting of the acquisition as a tender offer were defensive 
measures to be analyzed under Unocal.174  The courts’ refusal to apply the 
business judgment rule to these deal protective devices was perfectly proper 
given the conflict of interest inherent when target managers use them to tip 
the outcome of a takeover contest to one bidder over another, at least before 
there has been a fair competition between the two bidders to elicit the best 
price for the shareholders.175 
e.  Did the Time Opinion Adequately Respond to 
a Target Board’s Conflict of Interest? 
In many of the pre-Time chancery court cases upon which Chancellor 
Allen had relied, the competing bid was created internally by the target’s 
managers rather than being made by an outside white knight.176  In these 
cases, the target’s board typically created or refused to redeem an existing 
poison pill.  While the hostile bidder was delayed by the pill, the target’s 
board approved a defensive restructuring intended to give management 
effective voting control or to otherwise make the target unpalatable to 
potential bidders. 
In a common scenario, the target paid a dividend to its shareholders 
consisting of cash (often borrowed) and debt securities, which had the effect 
of reducing the post-dividend value of the target’s stock to the extent of the 
distribution.  In some cases, the transaction also was structured so that 
 
 173. See generally Marc I. Steinberg, Nightmare on Main Street:  The Paramount Picture 
Horror Show, 16 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 15 (1991) (arguing that the Delaware Supreme Court’s 
Time opinion “narrowly constru[ed] Revlon’s scope”); Charles Yablon, Overcompensating:  
The Corporate Lawyer and Executive Pay, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1867, 1869 (1992) (arguing 
that “doctrinally, Time was about delimiting the appropriate scope of the Unocal and Revlon 
standards”). 
 174. See Time, 571 A.2d at 1152 (affirming the chancery court’s ruling “that Unocal 
applied to all [Time] director actions taken, following receipt of Paramount’s hostile tender 
offer, that were reasonably determined to be defensive”). 
 175. For an analysis of the Delaware Supreme Court’s application of the Unocal standard 
in Time, see BAINBRIDGE, supra note 1, at 397–400. 
 176. The description and analysis of these cases in this section borrows from id. at 399–
400. 
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target managers or the target’s employee stock ownership plan effectively 
received the dividend in the form of target common stock at an exchange 
rate based on the stock’s post-dividend value.177  Alternatively, the target 
might conduct a tender offer in which public shareholders exchange their 
stock for cash and debt.178  In either case, management’s equity interest in 
the corporation increased substantially relative to that of the public 
shareholders, creating a formidable barrier for any post-transaction hostile 
bidder. 
In contrast, as Chancellor Allen emphasized, nothing Time’s board of 
directors did created any obstacle for a post-transaction bidder defensive 
action other than the postmerger combined Time-Warner entity’s great 
size.179  So long as a hostile bidder had sufficiently deep pockets and a 
large enough debt capacity, nothing precluded such a bidder from buying 
the combined Time-Warner corporation and, if so desired, spinning or 
selling off unwanted divisions.180  Accordingly, the Time-Warner 
transaction was more akin to a repeat game than a final period one and, as 
such, the target board’s conflict of interest was constrained by the market 
for corporate control in ways that had not been true of the defensive 
restructuring cases. 
Another important distinction between Time and the earlier cases was 
that Time’s board was motivated throughout by a desire to advance 
legitimate corporate interests.  In effect, Paramount was asking the 
Delaware courts to block Time’s board from continuing to operate the 
corporation’s business and affairs during the pendency of the takeover bid.  
The Delaware courts were properly reluctant to do so, as a hostile bidder 
has no right to expect the incumbent board of directors to stop an ongoing 
business strategy in midstream. 
In sum, Time presented a highly unusual set of facts, which rebutted the 
inference that the board acted from improper motives and rendered the 
result—if not the reasoning—in that particular case relatively 
unobjectionable.  Many fruitful avenues for limiting Time’s reasoning thus 
presented themselves.  The question was whether the Delaware Supreme 
Court would avail itself of those options or would continue down the road 
of retreat Time’s reasoning appeared to mark out. 
 
 177. E.g., Black & Decker Corp. v. Am. Standard, Inc., 682 F. Supp. 772, 776–77 (D. 
Del. 1988); Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining Corp., 535 A.2d 1334, 1345 (Del. 1987); 
Robert M. Bass Grp., Inc. v. Evans, 552 A.2d 1227, 1236–37 (Del. Ch. 1988). 
 178. E.g., AC Acquisitions Corp. v. Anderson, Clayton & Co., 519 A.2d 103 (Del. Ch. 
1986). 
 179. See Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. Time Inc., 1989 WL 79880, at *22 (Del. Ch. July 
14, 1989) (“The merged Time-Warner company would be large, it is true . . . , but recent 
history has shown that huge transactions can be done.”). 
 180. See id. (noting that, “if a leveraged acquisition of both participants was feasible 
before the merger, one cannot say that a stock for stock consolidation of such firms would 
necessarily preclude an acquisition of it thereafter, or so defendants contend”). 
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2.  QVC 
Some five years later, the Delaware Supreme Court revisited the issues 
posed in its Time opinion in a major decision that, oddly enough, also 
involved Paramount Communications.181  Paramount agreed to merge with 
Viacom, a major media conglomerate whose CEO and controlling 
shareholder was Sumner Redstone.  In order to discourage competitive bids, 
the companies included a number of exclusivity provisions in the agreement 
and plan of merger.  A no-shop clause precluded Paramount’s board from 
discussing a potential business combination with a third party unless the 
third party could show that its proposal was not subject to financial 
contingencies, and the Paramount board determined that its fiduciary duties 
obliged it to enter negotiations with the third party.182  A termination fee 
obligated Paramount to pay Viacom $100 million if “(a) Paramount 
terminated the Original Merger Agreement because of a competing 
transaction; (b) Paramount’s stockholders did not approve the merger; or 
(c) the Paramount Board recommended a competing transaction.”183  In 
addition to the agreement and plan of merger, Viacom and Paramount also 
entered into a stock lockup option, under which, if the Viacom deal fell 
through for any reason that triggered the termination fee, Viacom would be 
able to purchase shares representing approximately 20 percent of 
Paramount’s outstanding common stock.184  As the court explained, the 
agreement also “contained two provisions that were both unusual and 
highly beneficial to Viacom.”185  First, Viacom could pay for the shares 
using a senior subordinated note of questionable marketability instead of 
cash.  Second, in lieu of exercising the option, Viacom could elect to 
require Paramount to pay Viacom in cash a sum equal to the difference 
 
 181. Paramount Commc’ns Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34 (Del. 1994).  The 
analysis in this section borrows in part from BAINBRIDGE, supra note 1, at 400–03. 
 182. See QVC, 637 A.2d at 39 (describing the no-shop clause). 
 183. Id.  Provisions for monetary compensation of the favored bidder in the event the 
transaction fails to go forward long have been common in negotiated acquisitions. E.g., 
Cottle v. Storer Commc’n, Inc., 849 F.2d 570, 578 (11th Cir. 1988); Beebe v. Pac. Realty 
Trust, 578 F. Supp. 1128, 1150 n.7 (D. Or. 1984).  Termination fees, such as those at issue in 
QVC, are essentially liquidated damages payable if the acquirer fails to receive the expected 
benefits of its agreement.  The fee ordinarily falls in a range of 1 to 5 percent of the proposed 
acquisition price. See St. Jude Med., Inc. v. Medtronic, Inc., 536 N.W.2d 24, 27 (Minn. Ct. 
App. 1995) (citing Stephen M. Bainbridge, Exclusive Merger Agreements and Lock-ups in 
Negotiated Corporate Acquisitions, 75 MINN. L. REV. 239, 246 (1991)).  Payment of the fee 
is commonly triggered by the acquisition of a specified amount of target stock by a third 
party. E.g., Hanson Trust PLC v. ML SCM Acquisition Inc., 781 F.2d 264, 269 (2d Cir. 
1986); Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 178 (Del. 
1986).  Variants include termination of the merger agreement by the target or shareholder 
rejection of the acquisition proposal. E.g., Cottle, 849 F.2d at 572; Beebe, 578 F. Supp. at 
1150.  White knights proposing a leveraged buyout of the target in response to a hostile 
takeover bid may also require an engagement fee, requiring the target to pay a relatively 
small fee as consideration for the white knight’s preparation and submission of its bid. E.g., 
Cottle, 849 F.2d at 572; Hanson Trust PLC, 781 F.2d at 269. 
 184. See QVC, 637 A.2d at 39 (describing the agreement). 
 185. Id. 
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between the strike price in the option and the market price of Paramount’s 
stock.186  The potential value of the option to Viacom was uncapped and 
eventually “increased to nearly $500 million.”187 
Despite the obstacles created by these defenses, QVC made a competing 
offer for Paramount.188  Going forward from this point, the takeover fight 
was further complicated by the intrusion of Hollywood egos.  Paramount 
CEO Davis Martin had once fired QVC’s CEO and major shareholder, 
Barry Diller, and the two apparently hated each other.189 
Following several rounds of bidding, Paramount’s board announced that 
it would recommend acceptance of the Viacom proposal and would 
continue to resist QVC’s offer.190  In response, QVC brought suit seeking to 
enjoin Paramount’s defensive efforts to protect the Viacom deal. 
Paramount relied on Time to argue that its defensive actions had not 
triggered Revlon.  Because Paramount had neither initiated an active 
bidding process nor approved a breakup of the company, this was not an 
implausible argument.191  The facts of QVC thus highlighted the potential 
doctrinal mischief done by Time.  Assuming that Revlon had not been 
triggered, the issue would be whether Paramount’s defensive actions could 
be sustained under a Unocal-style analysis.  A successful Paramount-
Viacom merger would not have legally precluded QVC from attempting to 
purchase the combined Viacom-Paramount entity.  Accordingly, there was 
a strong argument that Paramount’s actions should pass muster under 
Time’s reading of Unocal.192  But while nothing Paramount had done 
created a legal obstacle to a QVC bid for the postmerger combined Viacom-
 
 186. Id. 
 187. Id. at 40 n.5. 
 188. See id. at 39–40 (discussing QVC’s initial competing bid). 
 189. See John Greenwald, The Deal That Forced Diller To Fold, TIME, Feb. 28, 1994, at 
50, 51 (describing the Diller-Davis feud).  Edward Rock points out that the ego clash meant 
that QVC implicated accountability concerns in a way that Time had not: 
  In Time-Warner, fully informed directors acted deliberately pursuant to a well-
thought-out long-term plan.  Along comes Paramount, which tries to stop the Time 
board.  In response, the directors reject Paramount’s efforts and determine to 
continue their long-term plan.  In Viacom, a strong-willed CEO misleads the 
board, keeps crucial information from them, prevents them from discussing the 
terms of the bid with Barry Diller, and structures the transaction so that QVC is at 
a serious disadvantage because of personal antipathy for Diller.  From this 
perspective, the cases are completely consistent with Delaware norms.  Strong-
willed CEOs who dominate directors are disfavored.  Allowing personal antipathy 
for a bidder to interfere with the board’s serious consideration of the bid is wrong.  
Tilting the playing field towards management’s preferred bidder immediately 
raises questions. 
Edward B. Rock, Saints and Sinners:  How Does Delaware Corporate Law Work?, 
44 UCLA L. REV. 1009, 1081 (1997) (footnotes omitted).  As he aptly summarizes,  “The 
principal difference between the two cases is that the managers and board behaved well in 
Time-Warner and badly in QVC.” Id. at 1086. 
 190. See QVC, 637 A.2d at 40–41 (describing the bidding process). 
 191. See supra note 172 and accompanying text (quoting Time’s discussion of Revlon 
triggers). 
 192. See supra notes 179–80 and accompanying text (discussing the importance of how, 
in Time, a bid for the combined entity was not precluded). 
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Paramount entity, QVC—and any other bidder—would face an 
insurmountable practical barrier in the form of Sumner Redstone.  As 
controlling shareholder of Viacom, Redstone would have controlled the 
combined Paramount-Viacom entity.193 
The presence of a controlling shareholder substantially changes the 
conflict of interest mix.  In an acquisition of one publicly held corporation 
by another public corporation, diversified shareholders should be indifferent 
as to the allocations of gains between the two corporate entities.  To 
understand why that is the case, begin by assuming that the typical 
acquisition generates gains equal to 50 percent of the target’s pre-offer 
market price.  Fully diversified investors are as likely to own acquiring 
company shares as target shares; indeed, they may own shares in both 
corporate entities.194  Because increasing the target’s share of the gains by 
increasing the premium the acquirer pays to obtain control necessarily 
reduces the acquirer’s share, the diversified investor will view such a shift 
as simply robbing Peter to pay Paul.195  Indeed, if changing the gain 
allocation between the two raises total transaction costs, such changes leave 
fully diversified investors worse off, because expenditures devoted to 
shifting the gain allocation between the parties amount to a tax on investors 
in favor of outsider advisors such as lawyers, investment bankers, and 
others.196 
If the acquiring entity is privately held, however, even a fully diversified 
investor can never be on both sides of the transaction.  If the intermediate 
case in which the acquiring entity is publicly held, but is controlled by a 
single shareholder, as in QVC, a fully diversified investor likely will not 
share pro rata in the gains reaped by the acquiring company because the 
large shareholder’s control enables it to reap a non–pro rata share of any 
such gains.197  Accordingly, in the QVC situation, diversified investors 
 
 193. See QVC, 637 A.2d at 43 (noting that after the merger “there will be a controlling 
stockholder,” referring to Redstone). 
 194. See Robert B. Thompson & Paul H. Edelman, Corporate Voting, 62 VAND. L. REV. 
129, 154 (2009) (“When the shareholder census consists of diversified investors such as 
institutional shareholders, these investors may well own shares in companies on both sides of 
the deal . . . .”). 
 195. See In re Toys “R” Us, Inc. S’holder Litig., 877 A.2d 975, 1021 (Del. Ch. 2005) 
(“For diversified investors as likely to own the shares of an acquiror as a target, it is often the 
case that the premium paid in an M & A deal goes from one pocket to another.”); cf. William 
T. Allen et al., The Great Takeover Debate:  A Meditation on Bridging the Conceptual 
Divide, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1067, 1077 (2002) (arguing that, for investors holding diversified 
portfolios, gains from holding target company stock are likely to be offset by losses from 
holding acquirer stock). 
 196. Professor Bernard Black argues that “apart from transaction costs, overpayment [by 
takeover acquirers] does not cause losses to diversified investors because such investors are 
indifferent to whether the bidder pays excess cash to its own or to the target’s shareholders,” 
thereby simultaneously acknowledging and downplaying the role of transaction costs. 
Bernard S. Black, Bidder Overpayment in Takeovers, 41 STAN. L. REV. 597, 649 (1989). 
 197. Cf. Nina A. Mendelson, A Control-Based Approach to Shareholder Liability for 
Corporate Torts, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1203, 1207 (2002) (noting that a controlling 
shareholder’s “general ability to reap a share of corporate benefits in excess of a pro rata 
share”). 
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should not be indifferent to how the gain is allocated between target and 
acquirer.  Instead, such investors should prefer that as much of the gain as 
possible be allocated to the target.198 
Unfortunately, there is good reason to suspect that target directors and 
managers will favor the privately held acquirer’s interests over those of the 
target shareholders.  The controlling shareholder’s ability to reap a 
disproportionate share of post-transaction gains, for example, gives it an 
unusually high incentive to cause the acquiring entity to offer side payments 
to target directors and managers in order to obtain their cooperation.  In 
turn, the controlling shareholder’s de facto ability to block acquisition 
proposals for the postmerger combined entity insulates that conflict of 
interest from the constraining influence of the market for corporate 
control.199  As a result, the conflict of interest inherent in any corporate 
control auction is substantially magnified in the QVC situation.  In addition, 
of course, the facts of that case presented a unique conflict due to the 
clashing Hollywood egos at play.200 
The QVC court demonstrated its sensitivity to this concern by holding 
that the Paramount board’s conduct was subject to enhanced judicial 
scrutiny: 
Such scrutiny is mandated by:  (a) the threatened diminution of the 
current stockholders’ voting power; (b) the fact that an asset belonging to 
public stockholders (a control premium) is being sold and may never be 
available again; and (c) the traditional concern of Delaware courts for 
actions which impair or impede stockholder voting rights.201 
As Dooley observes, the factors the court identified seem incongruous, 
because they have little to do with the conflicted interest focus of Unocal 
and Revlon.202  As applied to the specific facts of QVC, however, references 
to the shareholders’ interest in the control premium presumably reflect the 
possibility that conflicted interests on the part of Paramount’s directors 
would lead them to take actions that transferred gains from their 
shareholders to Viacom and Redstone.203 
 
 198. Cf. DOOLEY, supra note 25, at 577 (noting that the QVC court expressed concern that 
“voting control is generally achieved only at the price of paying a ‘premium’ to the minority 
shareholders for the loss of their voting influence (fluid and dispersed though it is), and that 
public shareholders lose the expectation of receiving any such premium once control has 
been transferred to and consolidated in a majority shareholder”). 
 199. Cf. Bershad v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 535 A.2d 840, 844–45 (Del. 1987) (holding 
that a target company’s controlling shareholder has no duty to sell his shares to a prospective 
acquirer, even if an acquisition would benefit the minority shareholders). 
 200. See supra note 189 (discussing the clash of egos). 
 201. QVC, 637 A.2d at 45 (emphasis added). 
 202. DOOLEY, supra note 25, at 577. 
 203. The same concern seems to underlie then-Vice Chancellor Jacobs’s observation that 
the shareholders’ continuing equity interest is far from secure, because once the 
Viacom transaction is complete Mr. Redstone will have absolute control of the 
merged entity and will have the power to use his control at any time to eliminate 
the shareholders’ interest by a “cash out” merger.  In this case the board did not 
obtain, or even bargain for, structural protections that would ensure the continuity 
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In QVC, the Delaware Supreme Court did not overrule Time, but did 
limit Time to its unique facts, thereby seemingly recognizing—albeit sub 
silentio—the doctrinal limitations Time imposed on the Delaware courts’ 
ability to police target directors’ and managers’ conflicted interests.  Recall 
that the critical passage in Time was the claim that, “[u]nder Delaware law 
there are, generally speaking and without excluding other possibilities, two 
circumstances which may implicate Revlon duties,” which were initiation of 
an active bidding process and approval of a breakup of the company.204  In 
QVC, the court seized upon the qualifying phrase “without excluding other 
possibilities.”205  In this case, the court opined, one of the other possibilities 
was present—namely, a change of control.206  Accordingly, Revlon was 
triggered.207 
By thus rehabilitating Chancellor Allen’s Time opinion, which the court 
went out of its way to describe as “well-reasoned,”208 and by resurrecting 
the change of control test, QVC specifically addressed the potential for 
conflicted interests on the part of directors in transactions like the one at 
hand.  In addition to rewriting Time’s narrow interpretation of Revlon, the 
QVC decision introduced a subtle but highly significant doctrinal shift.  
While Time had treated Unocal and Revlon as separate standards of review, 
QVC restored the pre-Time view that they are part of a single line of cases 
in which the significant conflict of interest found in certain control 
transactions justified enhanced judicial scrutiny.209 
Likewise, while Time had emphasized the formal tests announced in 
Unocal and Revlon, the QVC court struck out in a less rigid direction.  As 
described by QVC, the enhanced scrutiny test is basically a reasonableness 
inquiry to be applied on a case-by-case basis.  This inquiry has two key 
features.  First, the court must determine whether the directors had followed 
an adequate decision-making process in gathering information and 
 
of Paramount’s current shareholders (or their successors) in any merged enterprise.  
Absent such protection, these shareholders can have no assurance that they will 
receive the long-run benefits claimed to justify the board’s decision to prefer 
Viacom over QVC.  This is the only opportunity that Paramount’s shareholders 
will ever have to receive the highest available premium-conferring transaction.  
For this reason as well, fairness requires that the shareholders be afforded the 
fiduciary protections mandated by Revlon and Unocal. 
QVC Network, Inc. v. Paramount Commc’ns Inc., 635 A.2d 1245, 1266–67 (Del. Ch. 1993) 
(footnote omitted), aff’d, 637 A.2d 34 (Del. 1994). 
 204. Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1150 (Del. 1989) 
(emphasis added). 
 205. Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 46–48 (Del. 1994). 
 206. Id. at 48. 
 207. Id. 
 208. Id. at 47. 
 209. See id. at 46 (quoting Barkan v. Amsted Indus., Inc., 567 A.2d 1279, 1286 (Del. 
1989), for the proposition that “the general principles announced in Revlon, in Unocal Corp. 
v. Mesa Petroleum Co., and in Moran v. Household International, Inc. govern this case and 
every case in which a fundamental change of corporate control occurs or is contemplated” 
(emphasis removed) (citations omitted). 
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evaluating the need for takeover defenses.210  Second, the court must 
determine that the directors’ decisions were reasonable under the 
circumstances.211  The directors have the burden of proof on both aspects of 
the inquiry, although the directors need not prove that they made the right 
decision, but merely that their decision fell within the range of 
reasonableness.212 
The reasonableness standard was the logical culmination of the case law 
evolution toward using the Unocal and Revlon standards as a sieve for 
conflicted interests.  Notice that the reasonableness test parallels the 
definition of fairness used in the former Model Business Corporation Act 
provisions governing interested director transactions, namely, whether the 
transaction in question falls “within the range that might have been entered 
into at arms-length by disinterested persons.”213  Both standards ferret out 
board actions motivated by conflicted interests by contrasting the decision 
at hand to some objective standard.  The assumption seems to be that a 
reasonable decision is unlikely to be motivated by conflicted interest or, at 
least, that improper motives are irrelevant so long as the resulting decision 
falls within a range of reasonable outcomes.  Put another way, the 
animating principle behind both standards seems to be “no harm, no foul,” 
which seems sensible enough. 
D.  Summation 
In sum, the search for conflicted interests reflects the Delaware courts’ 
solution to the irreconcilable tension between authority and accountability.  
Concern for accountability drives the courts’ expectation that the board will 
function as a separate institution independent from and superior to the 
firm’s managers.  The court will inquire closely into the role actually played 
by the board, especially the outside directors, the extent to which they were 
supplied with all relevant information and independent advisors, and the 
extent to which they were insulated from management influence.  Only if 
the directors had the ultimate decision-making authority, rather than 
incumbent management, will the board’s conduct pass muster.  But if it 
does, respect-for-authority values will require the court to defer to the 
board’s substantive decisions.  The board has legitimate authority in the 
takeover context, just as it has in proxy contests and a host of other 
decisions that nominally appear to belong to the shareholders.  Nor can the 
board’s authority be restricted in this context without impinging on the 
board’s authority elsewhere.  Authority thus cannot be avoided any more 
 
 210. QVC, 637 A.2d at 45. 
 211. Id. 
 212. See id. (holding that “a court applying enhanced judicial scrutiny should be deciding 
whether the directors made a reasonable decision, not a perfect decision”). QVC also 
strongly indicated that a court should not second-guess a board decision that falls within the 
range of reasonableness, “even though it might have decided otherwise or subsequent events 
may have cast doubt on the board’s determination.” Id. 
 213. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT ANN. § 8.31 cmt. 4 (1984). 
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than can accountability; the task is to come up with a reasonable balance.  
Properly interpreted, that is precisely what the Delaware cases have done. 
III.  A MAP OF REVLON-LAND POST-QVC 
Any effort to map Revlon-land requires resolution of two critical 
questions.  First, when do directors stop being “defenders of the corporate 
bastion” and become “auctioneers”?  Second, what are the directors’ 
obligations once their role shifts? 
A.  Revlon-Land’s Borders 
Shortly after deciding QVC, the Delaware Supreme Court settled on a 
three-pronged standard for determining whether Revlon had come into play: 
 The directors of a corporation have the obligation of acting reasonably 
to seek the transaction offering the best value reasonably available to the 
stockholders in at least the following three scenarios:  (1) when a 
corporation initiates an active bidding process seeking to sell itself or to 
effect a business reorganization involving a clear break-up of the 
company; (2) where, in response to a bidder’s offer, a target abandons its 
long-term strategy and seeks an alternative transaction involving the 
break-up of the company; or (3) when approval of a transaction results in 
a sale or change of control.  In the latter situation, there is no sale or 
change in control when [c]ontrol of both [companies] remain[s] in a large, 
fluid, changeable and changing market.214 
Outside those three situations, which do not even encompass all corporate 
control auctions, Unocal remains the defining standard, as the court 
elsewhere emphasized by flipping the Revlon metaphor around to hold that 
“[w]hen a corporation is not for sale, the board of directors is the defender 
of the metaphorical medieval corporate bastion and the protector of the 
corporation’s shareholders.”215  Accordingly, outside Revlon-land, a target 
board may respond defensively to a bidder “at the corporate bastion’s 
gate.”216 
B.  Directors’ Duties in Revlon-land 
Although the court continued to identify a limited class of cases in which 
Revlon was the controlling precedent, it also continued to confirm QVC’s 
holding that Revlon is properly understood as a mere variant of Unocal 
 
 214. Arnold v. Soc’y for Sav. Bancorp, Inc., 650 A.2d 1270, 1289–90 (Del. 1994) 
(footnotes omitted) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 215. Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1388 (Del. 1995).  In Unitrin, the 
target’s board had adopted a poison pill, amended the bylaws to add additional defenses, and 
initiated a defensive stock repurchase.  The chancery court found the latter “unnecessary” in 
light of the poison pill, but the Supreme Court reversed. Id. at 1367.  The Supreme Court 
held that “draconian” defenses (i.e., those that are “coercive or preclusive”) are invalid per 
se. Id. at 1387.  Defenses that are not preclusive or coercive, however, are to be reviewed 
under QVC’s “range of reasonableness” standard. Id. at 1387–88. 
 216. Id. at 1388. 
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rather than as a separate doctrine.217  Having said that, however, application 
of the reasonableness standard does differ somewhat in cases falling within 
the borders of Revlon-land than in those governed by Unocal.  As the 
Delaware Chancery Court has observed, this is so because in the former a 
court must assess “a director’s performance of his or her duties of care, 
good faith and loyalty in the unique factual circumstance of a sale of control 
over the corporate enterprise.”218  Accordingly, what is reasonable under 
Unocal may not be reasonable in Revlon-land. 
1.  Consideration of Nonshareholder Interests 
The clearest example of how Revlon duties differ from those imposed by 
Unocal is the proper role, if any, of director concerns for corporate 
stakeholders other than shareholders.  In Unocal settings, the target’s board 
may consider “the impact [of the bid] on ‘constituencies’ other than 
shareholders (i.e., creditors, customers, employees, and perhaps even the 
community generally)” in whether the bid posed a cognizable threat.219  In 
Revlon-land, by contrast, directors may not consider any interest other than 
shareholder wealth maximization.220 
2.  Discrimination and Favoritism 
Many takeover defenses that pass muster under the Unocal standard 
involve discrimination between the bidder and other shareholders.  The 
stock repurchase at issue in Unocal itself excluded Mesa from 
participation.221  In contrast, once Revlon triggers, the target’s board of 
directors loses most of its power to discriminate between bidders and to 
favor one outcome of the takeover fight over another.  To be sure, while it 
is true that the board must take an “active and direct role in the sale 
process,”222 “there is no single blueprint that a board must follow to fulfill 
its [Revlon] duties.”223  Even so, however, the board’s goal must be “to 
secure the highest value reasonably attainable for the stockholders.”224 
 
 217. QVC Network, Inc. v. Paramount Commc’ns Inc., 635 A.2d 1245, 1267 (Del. Ch. 
1993) (“The basic teaching of Revlon and Unocal ‘is simply that the directors must act in 
accordance with their fundamental duties of care and loyalty.’”), aff’d, 637 A.2d 34 (Del. 
1994). 
 218. In re Lukens Inc. S’holders Litig., 757 A.2d 720, 731 (Del. Ch. 1999). 
 219. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985). 
 220. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del. 
1986). 
 221. See Unocal, 493 A.2d at 953–54 (holding that “a Delaware corporation may deal 
selectively with its stockholders, provided the directors have not acted out of a sole or 
primary purpose to entrench themselves in office”). 
 222. Citron v. Fairchild Camera & Instrument Corp., 569 A.2d 53, 66 (Del. 1989). 
 223. Barkan v. Amsted Indus., Inc., 567 A.2d 1279, 1286 (Del. 1989). 
 224. McMillan v. Intercargo Corp., 768 A.2d 492, 502 (Del. Ch. 2000).  But “[n]o court 
can tell directors exactly how to accomplish that goal, because they will be facing a unique 
combination of circumstances, many of which will be outside their control.” Lyondell Chem. 
Co. v. Ryan, 970 A.2d 235, 242 (Del. 2009). 
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Favoritism toward one bidder over the other therefore has been treated as 
highly suspect.  Although “[f]avoritism for a white knight to the total 
exclusion of a hostile bidder might be justifiable when the latter’s offer 
adversely affects shareholder interests,” the Delaware courts have made 
clear that “the directors cannot fulfill their enhanced Unocal duties by 
playing favorites with the contending factions.”225 
What does this mean for the use of lockup options and other exclusivity 
provisions in Revlon-land?  In Macmillan, the Delaware Supreme Court 
distinguished between lockups that draw an otherwise unwilling bidder into 
the contest and those that end an active auction by effectively foreclosing 
further bidding.226  While neither type is per se unlawful, the latter is 
subject to exacting judicial scrutiny.227  Where the target obtains only a 
minimal increase in the final bid in return for an auction-ending lockup, the 
agreement is unlikely to pass muster.228 
Of course, this distinction makes no practical sense.  Suppose a 
prospective white knight tells the target’s board that it will not bid unless 
the board grants the bidder a lockup amounting to 10 percent of the target’s 
outstanding shares.  In response, the initial bidder says that it will walk if 
the lockup is granted.  If both parties are credible, the lockup will 
simultaneously induce an unwilling bid and end the auction process.  
Accordingly, while the inducement versus end dichotomy 
has the virtue of appearing to encourage a desirable end—competitive 
bidding in acquisition transactions—it is not particularly helpful in 
determining the validity of any particular option because all lock-up 
options, by their nature, encourage the bid of the person receiving the 
lock-up and discourage the bids of all other persons.229 
The Eleventh Circuit cut through the confusion in Cottle v. Storer 
Communication, Inc.230  As we saw above, the court there recognized that 
all control “auctions must end sometime.”231  The court further 
acknowledged that the distinction between lockups that draw in a bidder 
 
 225. Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1288 (Del. 1988) (citations 
omitted). 
 226. See id. at 1286 (quoting Revlon to distinguish between lockups that “draw bidders 
into a battle” and those that “end an active auction and foreclose further bidding”). 
 227. See id. (distinguishing “the potentially valid uses of a lockup from those that are 
impermissible”). 
 228. See id. (“When one compares what KKR [the favored bidder] received for the 
lockup, in contrast to its inconsiderable offer, the invalidity of the agreement becomes 
patent.”). 
 229. Kenneth J. Nachbar, Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc.—The 
Requirement of a Level Playing Field in Contested Mergers, and Its Effect on Lock-ups and 
Other Bidding Deterrents, 12 DEL. J. CORP. L. 473, 488 (1987) (footnote omitted).  
Accordingly, “classifying a lockup as a permissible type that promotes bidding, or a harmful 
strain that discourages bidding, appears to be no more than conclusory judicial labels that are 
affixed by hindsight after the lockup has been scrutinized by the courts.” Leo Herzel, 
Misunderstanding Lockups, 14 SEC. REG. L.J. 150, 177 (1986). 
 230. 849 F.2d 570 (11th Cir. 1988). 
 231. Id. at 576 (quoting Cheff v. Mathes, 199 A.2d 548, 554 (Del. 1964)). 
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and those that end an auction is fatuous because all “lock-ups by definition 
must discourage other bidders.”232  Accordingly, the question is not 
whether a lockup ended the auction, but whether the target’s decision to 
grant the lockup was a reasonable one. 
Delaware courts likely would agree.  After all, if the analysis in the 
preceding part was correct in positing that motive is what matters, a board 
that conducts a fair auction is a board whose motives will withstand 
scrutiny. 
3.  No Liability for Mere Negligence 
The emphasis on analyzing the target board’s motives in determining 
whether their conduct satisfied Revlon is further exemplified by the 
chancery court’s Lukens decision.233  Vice Chancellor Lamb emphasized 
that Revlon, “like Unocal before it,” comes into play because “of ‘the 
omnipresent specter that a board may be acting primarily in its own interest, 
rather than those of the corporation and its shareholders.’”234  Accordingly, 
where “a complaint merely alleges that the directors were grossly negligent 
in performing their duties in selling the corporation, without some factual 
basis to suspect their motivations, any subsequent finding of liability will, 
necessarily, depend on finding breaches of the duty of care,”235 which in 
turn means that “judicial scrutiny will not often result in a greater likelihood 
of liability than if the business judgment presumption applied from the 
outset.”236  As a result, mere negligence in carrying out a sale of control 
should not result in liability under Revlon. 
4.  Liability for Bad Faith? 
While the precise geography of Revlon-land remains somewhat obscure, 
the decisions in Ryan v. Lyondell Chemical Co.237 offered important 
clarification by defining the relationship between Revlon and the emerging 
case law on the obligation of directors to act in good faith.238  In turn, that 
 
 232. Id. (citing Nachbar, supra note 229, at 488). 
 233. In re Lukens Inc. S’holders Litig., 757 A.2d 720 (Del. Ch. 1999).  We revisit Lukens 
below in connection with the opinion’s treatment of when Revlon duties apply. See infra Part 
IV. 
 234. Lukens, 757 A.2d at 731 (quoting Barkan v. Amsted Indus., Inc., 567 A.2d 1279, 
1286 (Del. 1989)). 
 235. Id. at 731–32. 
 236. Id. at 732 n.26. 
 237. C.A. No. 3176, 2008 WL 2923427 (Del. Ch. July 29, 2008), rev’d, 970 A.2d 235 
(Del. 2009). 
 238. The developing good faith obligation grew out of the Delaware Supreme Court’s 
1993 assertion that Delaware corporate law recognized a triad of fiduciary duties consisting 
of care, loyalty, and good faith. Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 361 (Del. 
1993).  Oddly, however, it was not until 2006 that the court began clarifying the triad 
formulation by defining good faith as encompassing 
all actions required by a true faithfulness and devotion to the interests of the 
corporation and its shareholders.  A failure to act in good faith may be shown, 
for instance, where the fiduciary intentionally acts with a purpose other than 
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guidance provided clarification of the extent to which an exculpatory 
provision in the target corporation’s certificate of incorporation can insulate 
the target’s directors from risk of monetary liability in Revlon cases.239 
The board of directors of Lyondell Chemical Co. was approached in 
April 2006 by Basell AF, which expressed an interest in acquiring 
Lyondell.240  The board thought the offered price was inadequate and 
expressed a lack of interest in selling.241  In May 2007, Access Industries, 
Basell’s parent corporation, filed a Schedule 13D announcing that it had the 
right to acquire an 8.3 percent stake in Lyondell.242  Lyondell’s board 
recognized that the Schedule 13D put it into play, but decided to take a 
wait-and-see approach to potential offers.243 
On July 9, 2007, Access owner Leonard Blavatnik met with Lyondell 
CEO Dan Smith to propose a $40 per share acquisition of Lyondell.244  
After negotiations, Blavatnik raised his offer to $48 per share, conditioned 
on a demand for a $400 million break-up fee and a merger agreement to be 
signed not later than July 16.245  Negotiations and due diligence followed 
for several days.246  On July 16, following a presentation by Lyondell’s 
financial advisors, who stated that $48 was “an absolute home run” and that 
 
that of advancing the best interests of the corporation, where the fiduciary 
acts with the intent to violate applicable positive law, or where the fiduciary 
intentionally fails to act in the face of a known duty to act, demonstrating 
conscious disregard for his duties. 
In re The Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 67 (Del. 2006) (quoting the 
chancery court decision below). 
  In Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362 (Del. 2006), the court provided further clarification 
by explaining “the obligation to act in good faith does not establish an independent fiduciary 
duty that stands on the same footing as the duties of care and loyalty.” Id. at 370.  Instead, 
the obligation to act in good faith is now subsumed wholly within the duty of loyalty. See id. 
(holding that “the fiduciary duty of loyalty is not limited to cases involving a financial or 
other cognizable fiduciary conflict of interest.  It also encompasses cases where the fiduciary 
fails to act in good faith.”). 
  For criticism of the Delaware cases on this duty of good faith, see BAINBRIDGE, 
supra note 1, at 160–63. 
 239. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2011) (authorizing corporations to include a 
provision in the certificate of incorporation that exculpates directors from monetary liability, 
but forbidding such exculpation, inter alia, “for acts or omissions not in good faith”). 
 240. Ryan v. Lyondell Chem. Co., C.A. No. 3176, 2008 WL 2923427, at *4 (Del. Ch. 
July 29, 2008), rev’d, 970 A.2d 235 (Del. 2009). 
 241. Id. 
 242. Id. at *4 n.17, *5. 
 243. Id. at *5. 
 244. Id. at *6. 
 245. Id. There was a certain amount of time pressure from Balavatnik’s perspective.  At 
the same time he was negotiating with Lyondell, he was also negotiating with an alternative 
target (Huntsman).  Blavatnik had a deadline of July 11 to raise his offer for Huntsman if he 
wanted to go forward with that acquisition, so he asked Smith for Lyondell to provide a firm 
indication of interest by the end of the day on the 11th.  Lyondell’s board decided to provide 
the requested indication.  Blavatnik announced he would not be raising his offer for 
Huntsman, and Huntsman terminated its negotiations with Blavatnik. See id. at 6–7 
(describing the Huntsman bid). 
 246. Ryan v. Lyondell Chem. Co., 970 A.2d 235, 238 (Del. 2009). 
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no other bidder was likely to pay more, Lyondell’s board approved the 
deal.247 
The chancery court conceded that Lyondell’s board “was active, 
sophisticated and generally aware of the value of the Company and the 
conditions of the markets in which the Company operated.”248  The board 
long had been kept up to date on the company’s financial outlook and plans.  
The board had been kept fully abreast of the negotiations with Access and 
another potential bidder.  The board had been briefed on Access’ proposal 
by Lyondell’s financial advisor. 
Despite all this, however, the chancery court found the board’s conduct 
deficient in a number of respects.  First, the “entire deal was negotiated, 
considered, and agreed to in less than seven days.”249  This gave the court 
“pause as to how hard the Board really thought about this transaction and 
how carefully it sifted through the available market evidence.”250  The 
court’s concern was consistent with an earlier Delaware Supreme Court 
caution that “boards ‘that have failed to exercise due care are frequently 
boards that have been rushed.’”251  Having said that, however, boards often 
must act quickly.  If courts insist that boards beat the bushes in search of the 
proverbial two birds, they force boards to risk losing the equally proverbial 
bird in the hand. 
Second, the court criticized the board for failing to conduct a “formal 
market check” by proactively seeking out competing bidders.252  The 
chancery court’s concern in this regard, however, overlooked clear 
Delaware Supreme Court teaching that no such formal test was mandatory 
even in Revlon-land.253 
Third, the court likewise criticized the board for not actively involving 
itself in the negotiation and sale processes.254  Here again, however, the 
chancery court overlooked clear Delaware Supreme Court teaching.  Recall 
that there is no single roadmap directors must follow through Revlon-
land.255 
Despite the dubious nature of its expressed concerns, the chancery court 
denied the defendant’s motion for summary judgment, holding that there 
was significant doubt that the board had satisfied its Revlon duties.256  Note 
that the chancery court thus not only exposed the board to the possibility 
 
 247. Id. at 239. 
 248. Lyondell, 2008 WL 2923427, at *13. 
 249. Id. at *14. 
 250. Id. 
 251. McMullin v. Beran, 765 A.2d 910, 922 (Del. 2000) (quoting Citron v. Fairchild 
Camera & Instrument Corp., 569 A.2d 53, 67 (Del. 1989)). 
 252. Lyondell, 2008 WL 2923427, at *14. 
 253. See generally Barkan v. Amsted Indus., Inc., 567 A.2d 1279 (Del. 1989). 
 254. Lyondell, 2008 WL 2923427, at *14. 
 255. See supra note 223 and accompanying text. 
 256. Lyondell, 2008 WL 2923427, at *19 (“The record, as it presently stands, does not, as 
a matter of undisputed material fact, demonstrate the Lyondell directors’ good faith 
discharge of their Revlon duties—a known set of ‘duties’ requiring certain conduct or 
impeccable knowledge of the market in the face of Basell’s offer to acquire the Company.”). 
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that its decisions would be enjoined, the usual remedy in the Unocal/Revlon 
context,257 but also the very serious risk of nonexculpable monetary 
liability.  In reversing, the Delaware Supreme Court emphasized that an 
“extreme set of facts” is required to sustain a bad faith claim.258  Only 
where the target’s board of directors “knowingly and completely failed to 
undertake their responsibilities would they breach their duty of loyalty.”259  
Put another way, liability would follow only where the “directors utterly 
failed to attempt to obtain the best sale price.”260  Although motive did not 
figure explicitly in that analysis, the Delaware Supreme Court’s Lyondell 
decision in fact is fully consistent with the argument in the preceding part 
that motive is what matters.  After all, why would a board consciously 
disregard known duties if not for some improper motive? 
Importantly, the Delaware Supreme Court emphasized that the emergent 
doctrine of good faith did not change the longstanding principle that there is 
no single roadmap boards must follow in Revlon-land.  The chancery court 
had held that Revlon duties required that “directors must ‘engage actively in 
the sale process,’ and they must confirm that they have obtained the best 
available price either by conducting an auction, by conducting a market 
check, or by demonstrating ‘an impeccable knowledge of the market.’”261  
In reversing, the Delaware Supreme Court held that “bad faith will be found 
if a ‘fiduciary intentionally fails to act in the face of a known duty to act, 
demonstrating a conscious disregard for his duties.’”262  Because there are 
“no legally prescribed steps that directors must follow to satisfy their 
Revlon duties,” however, “the directors’ failure to take any specific steps 
during the sale process could not have demonstrated a conscious disregard 
of their duties.”263 
IV.  CHANCERY REDRAWS THE BORDERS OF REVLON-LAND 
Recall that post-QVC a transaction entered Revlon-land via three 
checkpoints.264  Checkpoint 1 requires the target corporation to initiate “an 
active bidding process seeking to sell itself or to effect a business 
reorganization involving a clear breakup of the company,” with it being 
unclear whether the reference to a “breakup” modifies both halves of this 
checkpoint or only the latter.265  Checkpoint 2 requires that, “in response to 
a bidder’s offer, a target abandons its long-term strategy and seeks an 
 
 257. Cf. Paul Regan, Judicial Standards of Review of Corporate Fiduciary Action, 26 
DEL. J. CORP. L. 995, 1021 (2001) (“Most applications of Unocal result in injunction 
denied.”). 
 258. Lyondell, 970 A.2d at 243. 
 259. Id. at 243–44. 
 260. Id. at 244. 
 261. See id. at 243 (summarizing the chancery court holding). 
 262. Id. (citing the chancery court opinion). 
 263. Id. 
 264. See supra note 214 and accompanying text. 
 265. See Arnold v. Soc’y for Sav. Bancorp, Inc., 650 A.2d 1270, 1289–90 (Del. 1994) 
(footnotes omitted) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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alternative transaction involving the break-up of the company.”266  
Checkpoint 3 requires “a sale or change of control” of the target.267  In 
recent years, however, a number of chancery court decisions have 
disregarded this settled law and thus redrawn Revlon-land’s boundaries in 
ways that are inconsistent both with the policy framework developed above 
and Delaware Supreme Court precedents.   
A.  Hypotheticals 
This section offers some simplified hypotheticals designed to illustrate 
how Revlon ought to be applied in various settings, so as to set the stage for 
analyzing the ways in which the chancery court has departed from both 
precedent and sound policy in applying Revlon. 
1.  A Stock for Stock Merger of Equals 
Acme and Ajax are both public corporations listed on the New York 
Stock Exchange (NYSE).  Acme offers to acquire Ajax in a merger of 
equals in which Acme shareholders would receive Ajax stock for their 
Acme shares.  This is an easy case.  Recall that in Time, Chancellor Allen 
had said that Revlon was not triggered because there was no change of 
control.  This was so, he explained, because control of the combined entity 
after the merger remained “in a large, fluid, changeable and changing 
market.”268  The same is true here.269  Accordingly, because the merger 
does not involve a sale or other change of control, the Acme “board’s 
decision . . . is entitled to judicial deference pursuant to the procedural and 
substantive operation of the business judgment rule.”270  In contrast, if the 
acquiring firm has a controlling shareholder, the merger would result in the 
requisite change of control and Revlon would trigger.271 
2.  A Triangular Merger 
Start with the same facts as in the preceding hypothetical, but now 
assume Acme proposes a triangular merger in which Ajax would be merged 
into a wholly owned Acme subsidiary.  Despite the change in form, the 
substantive effect of this transaction is precisely the same.  The combined 
entity ends up being owned by dispersed shareholders “in a large, fluid, 
changeable and changing market.”  Only by elevating form over substance 
could Revlon apply here. 
 
 266. Id. 
 267. Id. 
 268. See supra note 170 and accompanying text. 
 269. See Krim v. ProNet, Inc., 744 A.2d 523, 527 (Del. Ch. 1999) (noting that Revlon 
“does not apply to stock-for-stock strategic mergers of publicly traded companies, a majority 
of the stock of which is dispersed in the market.”). 
 270. Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc., 818 A.2d 914, 928 (Del. 2003). 
 271. See Paramount Commc’ns Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 47–48 (Del. 
1994) (holding that Revlon was triggered because Viacom’s controlling shareholder Sumner 
Redstone would control the combined entity following the transaction). 
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3.  An Asset Sale 
This time, vary the hypothetical by assuming that Acme proposes to 
acquire substantially all of Ajax’s assets in exchange for Acme stock, after 
which Ajax will liquidate itself and, after paying off all creditors, distribute 
the remaining Acme shares to its shareholders as a liquidating final 
dividend.  Although the form of this transaction obviously involves a sale of 
Ajax’s assets and the disappearance of Ajax, the substance of the 
transaction is the same as in our first two hypotheticals.  Acme ends up 
owning Ajax, but control of the post-transaction entity ends up being owned 
by dispersed shareholders in the requisite “large, fluid, changeable and 
changing market.” 
4.  Transactions in Which Part or All of the Consideration Consists of Cash 
In this hypothetical, change the facts by changing the form of 
consideration.  Version A entails a merger between Acme and Ajax in 
which Ajax shareholders get cash for their stock.  Version B entails a 
triangular merger between Ajax and a wholly owned Acme subsidiary in 
which the Ajax shareholders get cash.  Version C is a tender offer for any 
and all Ajax shares for cash to be followed by a freeze-out merger in which 
any remaining Ajax shareholders will be squeezed out in return for cash. 
Checkpoint 1 is not triggered on the bare facts of any of these versions of 
the hypothetical.  Ajax did not initiate an active bidding process seeking to 
sell itself.  Likewise, none of the transactions will result in a business 
reorganization involving a clear break-up of the company. 
Checkpoint 2 is not triggered, inter alia, because none of Ajax’s actions 
were responsive to an unwanted offer. 
As for Checkpoint 3, the key issue is whether a cash sale constitutes “a 
sale or change of control.”  A going private transaction in which the target 
is acquired for cash by a private equity firm obviously would enter Revlon-
land via this third portal,272 but what if the acquirer is publicly held and has 
no controlling shareholder?  To answer that question, one must know 
whether control modifies both “sale” and “change” or only modifies 
“change.”  If the former, cash sales do not trigger Revlon duties if the 
acquirer is publicly held. 
 
 272. Indeed, such a transaction was the one at issue in Revlon itself. See Revlon, Inc. v. 
MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986) (discussing the Forstmann 
Little leveraged buyout firm’s attempt to acquire Revlon). 
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B.  Chancery Precedents on Cash Sales 
A number of chancery court decisions have found Revlon duties to be 
triggered by transactions in which all or part of the acquisition 
consideration consisted of cash.273 
1.  Lukens Inc. 
In 1998, Lukens, Inc. and Bethlehem Steel Corp. agreed to a merger in 
which the latter would exchange a combination of its stock and cash valued 
at $30 per share for each share of Lukens common stock.  The merger 
agreement provided that each Lukens shareholder would have the right to 
elect how much cash to receive, “subject to a maximum total cash payout 
equal to 62% of the total consideration.”274  If all Lukens shareholders 
opted for cash, the split thus would be 62–38 cash and stock. 
In dictum,275 Vice Chancellor Lamb observed: 
[A]lthough there is no case directly on point, I cannot understand how the 
Director Defendants were not obliged, in the circumstances, to seek out 
the best price reasonably available.  The defendants argue that because 
over 30% of the merger consideration was shares of Bethlehem common 
stock, a widely held company without any controlling shareholder, Revlon 
and QVC do not apply.  I disagree.  Whether 62% or 100% of the 
consideration was to be in cash, the directors were obliged to take 
reasonable steps to ensure that the shareholders received the best price 
 
 273. Not all chancery court decisions have fallen into this error, however.  For example, 
in In re Synthes, Inc. Shareholder Litigation, 50 A.3d 1022 (Del. Ch. 2012), Chancellor 
Strine observed: 
[P]laintiffs are also wrong on the merits of their argument that Revlon applies.  
Their sole basis for claiming that Revlon applies is that the Synthes stockholders 
are receiving mixed consideration of 65% J&J stock and 35% cash for their 
Synthes stock, and that this blended consideration represents the last chance they 
have to get a premium for their Synthes shares.  But under binding authority of our 
Supreme Court as set forth in QVC and its progeny, Revlon duties only apply when 
a corporation undertakes a transaction that results in the sale or change of 
control. . . . [T]he mixed consideration Merger does not qualify as a change of 
control under our Supreme Court’s precedent.  A change of control “does not 
occur for purposes of Revlon where control of the corporation remains, post-
merger, in a large, fluid market.”  Here, the Merger consideration consists of a mix 
of 65% stock and 35% cash, with the stock portion being stock in a company 
whose shares are held in large, fluid market. 
Id. at 1047 (footnotes omitted).  Chancellor Strine’s holding is fully consistent with the 
understanding of Revlon and its progeny advanced herein.  Curiously, however, Chancellor 
Strine fails to discuss any of the contrary chancery court precedents critiqued in the 
following sections. 
 274. In re Lukens Inc. S’holders Litig., 757 A.2d 720, 725 (Del. Ch. 1999). 
 275. The discussion of whether Revlon duties had triggered was mere dicta, because Vice 
Chancellor Lamb had concluded that, even “assuming that Revlon is implicated, the 
Complaint must still be dismissed.” Id. at 732 n.25.  This was so because plaintiff’s claims 
sounded solely under the duty of care and therefore were not cognizable in light of the target 
corporation’s exculpatory charter provision under section 102(b)(7). See id. at 732–34 
(discussing the effect of Lukens’s exculpatory charter provision). 
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available because, in any event, for a substantial majority of the then-
current shareholders, “there is no long run.”276 
Vice Chancellor Lamb cited no authority directly supporting his 
understanding of the change of control test.  The phrase, “there is no long 
run,” was quoted from an unpublished opinion by Chancellor Allen, in 
which the latter had indeed stated: 
 In the setting of a sale of a company for cash, the board’s duty to 
shareholders is inconsistent with acts not designed to maximize present 
share value, acts which in other circumstances might be accounted for or 
justified by reference to the long run interest of shareholders.  In such a 
setting, for the present shareholders, there is no long run.277 
Even so, however, Allen’s TW Services opinion provides little support for 
Lamb’s dicta.  First, Allen’s comment itself is also dictum.  The issue in TW 
Services was whether the target’s board of directors had properly decided to 
turn down a proposed merger.  Whether Revlon ever applied to such a 
decision was, Allen explained, an issue that did not then “need . . . [to] be 
decided.”278 
Second, Allen’s comment clearly is directed to sales of control in which 
100 percent of the consideration takes the form of cash.  This is shown, for 
example, by his description of the relevant transaction as one in which “all 
of the current shareholders will be removed from the field.”279  If even a 
small fraction of the consideration is in acquiring company stock or debt, 
however, not all of the current target shareholders will be removed from the 
field.  Some will remain as shareholders or creditors of the post-transaction 
combined entity (assuming that entity to be the field to which Allen 
referred). 
Third, the would-be acquirer in TW Services was a subsidiary of a limited 
partnership controlled by Coniston Partners, a private equity fund, through 
various affiliates.280  As such, although Allen did not highlight the issue in 
the relevant passage, this was not a case in which control of the post-
transaction combined entity was “in a large, fluid, changeable and changing 
market.”  To the contrary, if the transaction succeeded, the target would be 
taken private by Coniston and its affiliates who would thereafter 
exclusively control it.  In contrast, if the acquirer had been publicly held 
and lacked a controlling shareholder, the pre-transaction TW Services 
shareholders could use the cash they received in the acquisition to buy stock 
in the post-transaction combined entity.  Any removal from the field they 
might experience as a result of the transaction thus would be transitory.  Put 
another way, for them there is at least the potential for a long run. 
 
 276. Id. at 732 n.25. 
 277. TW Servs., Inc. v. SWT Acquisition Corp., Civ. A. Nos. 10427, 10298, 1989 WL 
20290, at *7 (Del. Ch. Mar. 2, 1989) (footnotes omitted). 
 278. Id. at *8. 
 279. Id. at *7. 
 280. See id. at *2 (describing the ownership structure of the proposed acquisition vehicle). 
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Taken together, these considerations show that TW Services at most 
stands for the proposition that a 100 percent cash sale of control triggers 
Revlon.  More likely, moreover, the case probably stands for the even more 
limited proposition that a 100 percent cash sale in the context of a going 
private transaction triggers Revlon.  In addition, as already noted, the 
passage on which Vice Chancellor Lamb relied was obvious dictum.  
Finally, although Delaware gives precedential value to unpublished 
opinions,281 surely that factor should be taken into account in assessing how 
much weight to give such opinions. 
The only other authority cited by Vice Chancellor Lamb in the relevant 
passage of Lukens was the Delaware Supreme Court’s decision in In re 
Santa Fe Pacific Corp. Shareholder Litigation.282  Because Santa Fe 
contradicts all of the relevant chancery court decisions to be discussed in 
this section, analysis of the conflict between it and Lukens is deferred until 
the other cases have been discussed.283  Suffice it for now to say that Vice 
Chancellor Lamb ducked Santa Fe by dismissing it out of hand.284 
2.  NYMEX 
The Lukens dicta seemingly went unnoticed for almost a decade, when it 
resurfaced in another chancery court decision.285  In 2007, the board of 
directors of NYMEX Holdings, Inc., set up a special committee to consider 
possible sales or acquisitions.286  Shortly thereafter, NYMEX Chairman of 
the Board Richard Schaeffer met with then–NYSE CEO John Thain.287  In 
their discussions, the latter “spoke of purchasing NYMEX for $142 per 
share,” but the NYSE ultimately failed to make a formal acquisition 
proposal.288 
Even before the abortive negotiations with the NYSE, Schaeffer and 
NYMEX CEO James Newsome had begun negotiations with 
representatives of CME Group, Inc., which eventually resulted in CME 
making an offer to acquire NYMEX.  CME offered a mix of cash and CME 
stock in exchange for the NYMEX stockholders’ shares, which represented 
a mix of “56% CME stock and 44% cash.”289 
In NYMEX, Vice Chancellor Noble raised, but ultimately did not resolve, 
the question of whether Revlon applied on those facts.290  As with Lukens, 
 
 281. See DEL. SUP. CT. R. 14(b)(vi)B(2) (2013). 
 282. 669 A.2d 59 (Del. 1995). 
 283. See infra Part IV.C. 
 284. See infra text accompanying note 333 (discussing Lukens’s analysis of Santa Fe). 
 285. A Westlaw search in the DE-CS database using the search term “Lukens /s Revlon” 
found no Delaware cases discussing the relevant dicta prior to the NYMEX decision. 
 286. In re NYMEX S’holder Litig., C.A. Nos. 3621-VCN, 3835-VCN, 2009 WL 
3206051 at *1 (Del. Ch. Sept. 30, 2009).  At that time, NYMEX “was the largest commodity 
futures exchange in the world.” Id. 
 287. Id. 
 288. Id. 
 289. Id. 
 290. Id. at *5–6. 
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the target corporation’s certificate of incorporation included a section 
102(b)(7) exculpatory provision, which required dismissal of the complaint 
because the plaintiffs had failed adequately to plead a breach of the duty of 
loyalty or lack of good faith.  Accordingly, as with Lukens, NYMEX’s 
precedential value is reduced because we again are dealing with dicta.291 
In that dicta, Vice Chancellor Noble opined: 
Revlon scrutiny applies only to transactions “‘in which a fundamental 
change of corporate control occurs or is contemplated.’” [Paramount 
Commc’ns Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 46 (Del. 1994) 
(quoting Barkan v. Amsted Indus., Inc., 567 A.2d 1279, 1286 
(Del.1989)).]  They dispute what constitutes a fundamental change of 
control sufficient to trigger Revlon scrutiny.  A fundamental change of 
control does not occur for purposes of Revlon where control of the 
corporation remains, post-merger, in a large, fluid market. [See id. at 47.]  
Thus, for example, in a transaction where cash is the exclusive 
consideration paid to the acquired corporation’s shareholders, a 
fundamental change of corporate control occurs—thereby triggering 
Revlon—because control of the corporation does not continue in a large, 
fluid market.  In transactions, such as the present one, that involve merger 
consideration that is a mix of cash and stock—the stock portion being 
stock of an acquirer whose shares are held in a large, fluid market—“[t]he 
[Delaware] Supreme Court has not set out a black line rule explaining 
what percentage of the consideration can be cash without triggering 
Revlon.” [In re Lukens Inc. S’holders Litig., 757 A.2d 720, 732 n.25 (Del. 
Ch. 1999).]292 
The block quotation includes the footnotes from the opinion to draw the 
reader’s attention to how carefully Vice Chancellor Noble included 
citations of support for three of the four sentences in the passage.  Crucially, 
however, he omitted a citation of support for the critical proposition that “a 
fundamental change of corporate control occurs” “in a transaction where 
cash is the exclusive consideration.”  If this passage constituted a holding 
rather than dicta, that statement would be the holding.  Of the four 
sentences in the passage, accordingly, it is this passage that most demands 
validation by precedent.  In light of the thorough job the Vice Chancellor 
did in providing support for his other assertions, this glaring omission is 
quite telling. 
The final sentence of the passage, with its quotation from Lukens, does 
not provide the missing support.  Even setting aside the argument above 
that Lukens should be given little precedential weight,293 the Lukens 
quotation does not tell the whole story.  True, the Delaware Supreme Court 
had not set out a bright-line rule defining what percentage of cash triggered 
 
 291. Cf. ONTI, Inc. v. Integra Bank, Civ. A. 14514, 1999 WL 160131, at *1 (Del. Ch. 
Mar. 2, 1999) (declining to find that “obiter dictum” held “any precedential value for my 
decision here”). 
 292. NYMEX, 2009 WL 3206051, at *5 (footnotes included in brackets). 
 293. See supra text accompanying note 291 (noting that the relevant passage from Lukens 
was mere dicta). 
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Revlon.  It was (and remains) equally true, however, that the Delaware 
Supreme Court has never held that the form and allocation of the 
consideration is even relevant to the question of whether Revlon has been 
triggered.  To the contrary, as discussed below, the better reading of the 
relevant Delaware Supreme Court precedents is that the form of the 
consideration is wholly irrelevant to that question.294 
Finally, notice that the passage also errs in asserting that “in a transaction 
where cash is the exclusive consideration paid to the acquired corporation’s 
shareholders . . . control of the corporation does not continue in a large, 
fluid market.”295  Obviously, this is a reference to Chancellor Allen’s 
holding in Time that the Time-Warner merger agreement would not result in 
a transfer of control because control remained “in a large, fluid, changeable 
and changing market.”296  In Time, Chancellor Allen obviously was 
referring to control not of the target corporation but to control of the post-
transaction combined entity.  A fluid market controlled the target and there 
was no change of control because control of the combined entity would 
remain in such a market after the transaction was completed.  In an all-cash 
deal—let alone a partial-cash deal like the one at issue in NYMEX—so long 
as the acquirer is publicly held, control of the combined post-transaction 
entity will rest in the hands of “a large, fluid, changeable and changing 
market.”  Accordingly, it is not the form of the consideration that matters 
under Time, but whether the acquirer has a controlling shareholder. 
3.  Smurfit-Stone Container Corp. 
Although both Lukens and NYMEX had limited precedential value on this 
point because the relevant passages were mere dicta, in Smurfit-Stone 
Container Corp. Shareholder Litigation,297 Vice Chancellor Parsons relied 
principally on those cases to hold—for the first time—that all- or partial-
cash transactions trigger Revlon.298  The case involved a triangular merger 
in which publicly held target Smurfit was to merge into a wholly owned 
subsidiary of publicly held acquirer Rock-Tenn Co.  In the merger, the 
shareholders of Smurfit got $35 per share, with 50 percent of the 
consideration paid in cash and 50 percent paid in Rock-Tenn stock.  
Accordingly, as the Vice Chancellor observed that, “this case provides 
cause . . . to address a question that has not yet been squarely addressed in 
Delaware law; namely, whether and in what circumstances Revlon applies 
when merger consideration is split roughly evenly between cash and 
stock.”299 
 
 294. See infra Part IV.C (discussing the relevant precedents). 
 295. NYMEX, 2009 WL 3206051, at *5. 
 296. See supra text accompanying note 170 (quoting the relevant passage from the Time 
opinion). 
 297. 2011 WL 2028076 (Del. Ch. 2011). 
 298. See id. at *12–14 (discussing when Revlon applies). 
 299. Id. at *1. 
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There was no dispute that Checkpoints 1 and 2 were not implicated on 
these facts.  There was no claim that the target’s board had initiated an 
active bidding process to sell itself or had sought to effect a reorganization 
involving a breakup of Smurfit.300  There was no claim that the board had 
abandoned its long-term strategy in response to a bidder’s offer or sought 
an alternative transaction involving a breakup of the target.301 
As such, only Checkpoint 3’s reference to “a sale or change of control” 
was at issue.302  Vice Chancellor Parsons began his analysis by observing 
that one entered Revlon-land via this checkpoint in all-cash transactions.303  
As support for that proposition, he cited Lukens, Topps, and TW Services.  
As we have seen, however, the latter is a very weak reed on which to rest 
that claim.  As for Topps,304 then–Vice Chancellor Strine opined therein 
that “[w]hen directors propose to sell a company for cash or engage in a 
change of control transaction, they must take reasonable measures to ensure 
that the stockholders receive the highest value reasonably attainable.”305  
Crucially, however, Topps involved a going private transaction in which the 
target would be acquired by “a private equity firm . . . , The Tornante 
Company, LLC, in an alliance with another private equity group, Madison 
Dearborn Capital Partners, LLC.”306  Accordingly, like TW Services, Topps 
does not stand for the proposition that a cash transaction by a publicly held 
acquirer triggers Revlon.  Finally, of course, Lukens was mere dicta on this 
point.307 
Unlike Lukens and NYMEX, both of which had failed to engage the key 
passage from Chancellor Allen’s Time opinion, in Smurfit Vice Chancellor 
Parsons expressly held that Revlon applied even though “control of Rock-
Tenn after closing will remain in a large, fluid, changing, and changeable 
market” and the “Smurfit-Stone stockholders will retain the right to obtain a 
control premium in the future.”308  Although he acknowledged that the 
defendants’ argument to the contrary was “cogent,”309 he dismissed it by 
observing that “[e]ven if Rock-Tenn has no controlling stockholder and 
Smurfit-Stone’s stockholders will not be relegated to a minority status in 
 
 300. See id. at *12 (“Plaintiffs do not allege that the Board initiated an active bidding 
process to sell itself or effected a reorganization involving the break-up of Smurfit-Stone.”). 
 301. See id. (noting that plaintiffs had not claimed “that the Board abandoned its long-
term strategy in response to a bidder’s offer and sought an alternative transaction involving 
the break-up of the Company”). 
 302. See id. (explaining that plaintiffs alleged that “Revlon should apply to this case 
because the Merger Consideration was comprised of 50% cash and 50% stock at the time the 
parties entered into the Agreement, which qualifies the Proposed Transaction as a ‘change of 
control’ transaction”). 
 303. See id. at *13 (“Revlon will govern a board’s decision to sell a corporation where 
stockholders will receive cash for their shares.”). 
 304. In re Topps Co. S’holders Litig., 926 A.2d 58 (Del. Ch. 2007). 
 305. Id. at 64. 
 306. Id. at 65. 
 307. See supra note 275 and accompanying text (explaining why the relevant statement in 
Lukens was dicta rather than a holding). 
 308. Smurfit, 2011 WL 2028076, at *15. 
 309. Id. 
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the postmerger entity, half of their investment will be liquidated.”310  
Accordingly, the Vice Chancellor asserted that “the fact that control of 
Rock-Tenn after consummation will remain in a large pool of unaffiliated 
stockholders, while important, neither addresses nor affords protection to 
the portion of the stockholders’ investment that will be converted to cash 
and thereby be deprived of its long-run potential.”311   
But that concern is misplaced.  First, the locus of control of the post-
transaction combined entity is not merely important, but rather is 
dispositive.  In Time, Chancellor Allen did not treat the locus as a factor to 
be considered.  Instead, he dismissed the Revlon claim solely because 
control of the combined entity remained “in a large, fluid, changeable and 
changing market.”312  Second, as we have now seen repeatedly, the 
argument about whether target shareholders get to participate in the long-
run potential of the combined entity is not a relevant—let alone 
dispositive—consideration.313 
In sum, by embracing Vice Chancellor Lamb’s reasoning, Vice 
Chancellor Parsons embraced error.  The precedents on which he relied 
provide weak reeds on which to rest such an important holding.  The policy 
arguments on which he relied likewise are unavailing.  The borders of 
Revlon-land thus have suffered a significant distortion. 
4.  Steinhardt 
Also in 2011, Vice Chancellor Laster issued a bench ruling possibly 
portending an even greater erosion of the borders of Revlon-land.314  In 
Steinhardt v. Howard-Anderson,315 Occam Networks proposed to acquire 
Calix in a merger in which the latter’s shareholders would receive a 
package of 50 percent cash and 50 percent stock valued at $7.75 per 
share.316  If the transaction went through, the former target shareholders 
would own between 15 percent and 19 percent of the post-transaction 
combined entity’s voting stock.317 
Vice Chancellor Laster held that the transaction should be reviewed 
using an “enhanced scrutiny” standard, which in context appears to be a 
 
 310. Id. 
 311. Id. 
 312. Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. Time, Inc., Nos. 10866, 10670, and 10935, 1989 WL 
79880, at *739 (Del. Ch. July 14, 1989), aff’d on other grounds, 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989). 
 313. See supra notes 294–96 and accompanying text (explaining why the form of 
consideration is not relevant). 
 314. I am indebted to Steven M. Haas, Esq., of Hunton & Williams for calling this case to 
my attention and providing a very helpful research memorandum about the case. See 
Memorandum from Steven M. Haas, Delaware Court Questions Application of Business 
Judgment Rule to Stock-for-Stock Mergers (February 8, 2011) (on file with the author). 
 315. Transcript of Ruling of the Court on Plaintiffs’ Motion for a Preliminary Injunction, 
Steinhardt v. Howard-Anderson, No. 5878-VCL (Del. Ch. Jan. 24, 2011) [hereinafter 
Transcript of Ruling], available at http://www.alston.com/files/docs/Occam_Ruling.pdf. 
 316. Haas, supra note 314. 
 317. Id. 
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reference to the QVC formulation of the unified standard of review 
applicable to both Unocal and Revlon cases.318  If the Vice Chancellor had 
hung his holding on Lukens, the case could be dismissed as simply moving 
the trigger at which Revlon comes into play from 60 percent cash down to 
50 percent cash.319  In fact, however, Vice Chancellor Laster focused on the 
fact that after the merger the former target shareholders would own only 
approximately 15 percent of the stock of the combined entity.  As a result, 
he worried, this was the last opportunity the target directors and managers 
would have to maximize the target shareholders’ share of a control 
premium.320  If the combined entity someday were to be sold, Laster 
opined, the Occam Network shareholders would “only get 15 percent” of 
any control premium paid in that later transaction.321 
As discussed below, Vice Chancellor Laster’s analysis is problematic in 
the first instance because the controlling Delaware Supreme Court 
precedents do not premise Revlon’s applicability on the ability of target 
shareholders to participate in future takeover premia.322  Second, the Vice 
Chancellor’s analysis overlooks many key facts.  If Calix were to be 
acquired in the future, any former target shareholders would now get the 
benefit of Calix’s directors’ and officers’ fiduciary duties.  By the time 
Calix was acquired in the future, moreover, many of the former target 
shareholders presumably long since would have sold their Calix shares.  If 
those shareholders are unlikely to be around when future takeover premia 
are divided, why should the prospect of such premia determine the fiduciary 
duties of the target’s board and management? 
Third, why rest the analysis on the possibility that the acquirer might be 
acquired in the future?  Many companies are never subjected to a takeover 
offer, let alone actually acquired.  In addition, assuming the companies least 
likely to be acquired in the future are those with a controlling shareholder, 
Vice Chancellor Laster’s analysis would imply that there is no reason to 
apply Revlon.  Yet, of course, that is precisely the context in which Revlon 
most clearly applies.323 
Finally, and most disturbingly, because Vice Chancellor Laster’s analysis 
does not depend on the percentage of the consideration paid in cash, that 
analysis would apply equally well to a stock-for-stock merger.  Yet, both 
Chancellor Allen and the Delaware Supreme Court’s opinions in Time 
 
 318. Transcript of Ruling, supra note 315, at 7. 
 319. Haas, supra note 314. 
 320. Transcript of Ruling, supra note 315, at 4–6 (“This is a situation where the target 
stockholders are in the end stage in terms of their interest in Occam.  This is the only chance 
they have to have their fiduciaries bargain for a premium for their shares as the holders of 
equity interests in that entity.”). 
 321. Id. 
 322. See infra notes 344–46 and accompanying text (discussing QVC’s discussion of the 
relevance of control premia). 
 323. See supra text accompanying note 271 (explaining that Revlon is triggered when the 
acquiring firm has a controlling shareholder). 
 2013] THE GEOGRAPHY OF REVLON-LAND 3331 
made clear that Revlon does not apply to such mergers.324  This doctrinal 
conflict suggests that Vice Chancellor Laster’s approach should be rejected. 
C.  Lukens and Its Progeny Are Inconsistent with Controlling Delaware 
Supreme Court Precedents 
The most directly relevant Delaware Supreme Court precedent is In re 
Santa Fe Pacific Corp. Shareholder Litigation.325  Santa Fe and Burlington 
were both publicly held Delaware corporations.326  After negotiations, they 
agreed to a complicated deal in which the two companies would make a 
joint tender offer for up to 33 percent of Santa Fe’s shares at $20 per share 
in cash.327  If successful, the offer would give Burlington 16 percent of 
Santa Fe’s remaining outstanding shares.328  If the offer succeeded, a 
freeze-out merger in which remaining Santa Fe shareholders would get 
Burlington shares in exchange for their Santa Fe stock would follow it.329  
All the while, Santa Fe’s board of directors was fending off an unsolicited 
takeover bid by Union Pacific.330 
The Delaware Supreme Court rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that the 
deal triggered Revlon duties for Santa Fe’s directors on grounds that the 
plaintiffs “failed to allege that control of Burlington and Santa Fe after the 
merger would not remain ‘in a large, fluid, changeable and changing 
market.’”331  The clear implication is that the form of consideration was not 
the relevant issue.  Instead, the issue was whether the Burlington 
shareholders would remain dispersed “in a large, fluid, changeable and 
changing market.” 
Yet, in NYMEX, the chancery court characterized Santa Fe as simply 
setting a floor—33 percent cash—below which one did not enter Revlon-
land.332  As for higher ratios, the chancery court relied on Lukens for the 
proposition that the Delaware “Supreme Court has not set out a black line 
rule explaining what percentage of the consideration can be cash without 
triggering Revlon.”333 
 
 324. See supra Part IV.A.1 (discussing rules governing stock-for-stock mergers). 
 325. 669 A.2d 59 (Del. 1995). 
 326. Id. at 63. 
 327. See id. at 63–64 (describing the negotiations and deal terms). 
 328. Id. at 64. 
 329. Id. 
 330. See id. at 63–64 (describing the Union Pacific offer). 
 331. Id. at 71. 
 332. In re NYMEX S’holder Litig., C.A. Nos. 3621-VCN, 3835-VCN, 2009 WL 
3206051, at *5 (Del. Ch. Sept. 30, 2009).   
 333. Id. In sharp contrast, Chancellor Strine recently observed: 
Here, the Merger consideration consists of a mix of 65% stock and 35% cash, with 
the stock portion being stock in a company whose shares are held in large, fluid 
market. In the case of In re Santa Fe Pacific Corp. Shareholder Litigation, the 
Supreme Court held that a merger transaction involving nearly equivalent 
consideration of 33% cash and 67% stock did not trigger Revlon review when 
there was no basis to infer that the stock portion of that consideration was stock in 
a controlled company.  That decision is binding precedent. 
In re Synthes, Inc. S’holder Litig., 50 A.3d 1022, 1048 (Del. Ch. 2012) (footnote omitted). 
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This characterization of Santa Fe is hard to square with the Delaware 
Supreme Court’s analysis in the case, which makes no reference to floors or 
ceilings, but rather to the postdeal “stock ownership structure of 
Burlington.”334  It is even more difficult to square with the three 
checkpoints established by Arnold v. Society for Saving Bancorp, Inc.335 
The Smurfit court finessed Arnold in the first instance by selective 
quotation of the key passage setting out the three checkpoints.  The Smurfit 
court quoted it as follows: 
 The Delaware Supreme Court has determined that a board might find 
itself faced with such a duty in at least three scenarios:  “(1) when a 
corporation initiates an active bidding process seeking to sell itself or to 
effect a business reorganization involving a clear break-up of the 
company[ ]; (2) where, in response to a bidder’s offer, a target abandons 
its long-term strategy and seeks an alternative transaction involving the 
break-up of the company; or (3) when approval of a transaction results in 
a sale or change of control[.]”336 
The observant reader will note that the chancery court thereby omitted the 
critical qualifier Arnold adds to Checkpoint 3.  To emphasize the point, let 
us quote the pertinent part of Arnold again in full:  “(3) when approval of a 
transaction results in a sale or change of control.  In the latter situation, 
there is no sale or change in control when [c]ontrol of both [companies] 
remain[s] in a large, fluid, changeable and changing market.”337 
Arnold’s clear implication is that an acquisition by a publicly held 
corporation with no controlling shareholder that results in the combined 
corporate entity being owned by dispersed shareholders in the proverbial 
“large, fluid, changeable and changing market” does not trigger Revlon 
whether the deal is structured as all stock, all cash, or somewhere in the 
middle.  The form of consideration is simply irrelevant. 
The Delaware Supreme Court’s more recent opinion in Lyondell 
confirms this reading of both Santa Fe and Arnold.  In addition to the 
substantive errors made by the chancery court in Lyondell,338 the chancery 
court also took too expansive an approach to when Revlon duties are 
triggered by holding that the target board enters Revlon-land when it 
“undertakes a sale of the company for cash.”339 
Checkpoint 1 was inapplicable on Lyondell’s facts, because the target 
board had not initiated “an active bidding process,” let alone one that would 
involve a breakup of the company.  Checkpoint 2 was inapplicable because 
 
 334. In re Santa Fe Pac. Corp. S’holder Litig., 669 A.2d 59, 71 (Del 1995). 
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the transaction did not involve a hostile offer or an abandonment of the 
target’s long-term strategy or a breakup of the company. 
Checkpoint 3, however, was triggered once the target board decided to 
sell the company to Access because Access was a privately held 
corporation.  The transaction therefore would have involved a change of 
control from disperse public shareholders in “a large, fluid, changeable and 
changing market” to a single controlling shareholder.  Although the 
Delaware Supreme Court did not quote that now proverbial standard, it did 
hold that one does not enter Revlon-land simply because a prospective 
target company is “in play.”340  Instead, one does so “only when a company 
embarks on a transaction—on its own initiative or in response to an 
unsolicited offer—that will result in a change of control.”341 
Fairly read, this confirms that in the phrase “sale or change of control,” 
as used in Checkpoint 3, control must be understood to modify both the 
words “sale” and “change.”  Accordingly, Lyondell confirms that the 
interpretation of Arnold and Santa Fe set out above is the correct one rather 
than that offered by the chancery court. 
D.  Lukens and Its Progeny Are Inconsistent with the Policies 
Underlying Revlon 
The logic of the chancery court decisions rests on the policy that target 
shareholders who get cash have no opportunity to participate in the 
potential postacquisition gains that may accrue to shareholders of the 
combined company: 
 Defendants emphasize that no Smurfit-Stone stockholder involuntarily 
or voluntarily can be cashed out completely and, after consummation of 
the Proposed Transaction, the stockholders will own slightly less than half 
of Rock-Tenn. . . .  Defendants lose sight of the fact that while no 
Smurfit-Stone stockholder will be cashed out 100%, 100% of its 
stockholders who elect to participate in the merger will see approximately 
50% of their Smurfit-Stone investment cashed out.  As such, like Vice 
Chancellor Lamb’s concern that potentially there was no “tomorrow” for 
a substantial majority of Lukens stockholders, the concern here is that 
there is no “tomorrow” for approximately 50% of each stockholder’s 
investment in Smurfit-Stone.  That each stockholder may retain a portion 
of her investment after the merger is insufficient to distinguish the 
reasoning of Lukens, which concerns the need for the Court to scrutinize 
under Revlon a transaction that constitutes an end-game for all or a 
substantial part of a stockholder’s investment in a Delaware 
corporation.342 
 
 340. Lyondell, 970 A.2d at 242. 
 341. Id. 
 342. Smurfit-Stone Container Corp. S’holder Litig., 2011 WL 2028076, at *14 (Del. Ch. 
May 24, 2011). 
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As we have seen, however, this concern makes no sense.343  As long as the 
acquirer is publicly held, shareholders who get cash could simply turn 
around and buy stock in the postacquisition company.  They would then 
participate in any post-transaction gains, including any future takeover 
premium.  Only if there has been a change of control is that option 
foreclosed. 
In any event, as the discussion in Part II.C makes clear, the relevant 
policy concern is not whether there is a future.  To be sure, QVC spoke of 
“an asset belonging to public shareholders” (i.e., “a control premium”).344  
As we saw above, although he did not cite QVC, Vice Chancellor Laster 
implicated this concern by holding that Revlon was triggered because the 
transaction at issue was the “only chance [the target shareholders would] 
have to have their fiduciaries bargain for a premium for their shares.”345 
If QVC is properly understood, however, the Delaware Supreme Court 
was not showing concern for whether there will be a tomorrow for the 
shareholders.  Instead, as discussed above, the court was concerned in QVC 
with the division of gains between target and acquirer shareholders because 
the post-transaction company would have a dominating controlling 
shareholder.346 
As the analysis of QVC in Part II.C.2 explained, the relevant concern thus 
is the potential that conflicted interests will affect the target’s board of 
directors’ decisions.347  Indeed, as we have seen, even Vice Chancellor 
Lamb’s opinion in Lukens recognized that the motivating concern 
underlying Revlon is “the omnipresent specter that a board may be acting 
primarily in its own interest, rather than those of the corporation and its 
shareholders.”348  Curiously, however, Vice Chancellor Lamb brought that 
policy concern into play only with respect to whether the directors had 
satisfied their Revlon duties, while ignoring it when deciding whether those 
duties have triggered.  But nothing in Revlon or QVC suggests that that 
policy is limited to the former issue rather than both inquiries. 
Because the conflict of interest policy concern is the underlying driver of 
both aspects of Revlon, the chancery court in Lukens and its progeny should 
 
 343. See supra text accompanying notes 279–80 (discussing Lukens last period 
argument). 
 344. See supra note 201 and accompanying text (quoting QVC). 
 345. See supra note 320 and accompanying text (quoting Transcript of Ruling, supra note 
315).  In In re Synthes, Inc. Shareholder Litigation, 50 A.3d 1022 (Del. Ch. 2012), the 
plaintiffs argued that Revlon was triggered by a deal “represent[ing] the last chance they 
have to get a premium for their [target company] shares.” Id. at 1047.  Chancellor Strine 
rejected that argument, holding that the plaintiffs were “wrong on the merits.” Id.  At least 
implicitly, Chancellor Strine thus rejected the focus in Steinhardt on the final period aspect 
of the transactions at bar. 
 346. See supra notes 202–03 and accompanying text (discussing the proper interpretation 
of QVC). 
 347. See supra notes 199–200 and accompanying text (discussing the conflicts of interest 
on the part of target managers and directors when the postmerger entity has a controlling 
shareholder). 
 348. See supra note 234 and accompanying text (quoting Lukens). 
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have considered whether the all- or partial-cash transactions necessarily 
implicate conflicts of interest akin to those at issue in Revlon and QVC.  If 
the various Vice Chancellors had done so, they would have recognized that, 
so long as acquisitions of publicly held corporations are conducted by other 
publicly held corporations, diversified shareholders will be indifferent as to 
the allocations of gains between the parties.349  In turn, those shareholders 
also will be indifferent as to the form of consideration. 
In contrast, if the transaction results in a privately held entity, a 
diversified shareholder cannot be on both sides of the transaction.  If the 
post-transaction entity remains publicly held, but will be dominated by a 
controlling shareholder, there is a substantial risk that the control 
shareholder will be able to extract non–pro rata benefits in the future and 
get a sweetheart deal from target directors in the initial acquisition.  In 
either situation, the division of gains matters a lot.  As such, investors 
would prefer to see gains in such transactions allocated to the target.350  It is 
in these situations that Revlon should come into play. 
E.  Should Revlon Be Extended to All Corporate Acquisitions? 
A proponent of Lukens and its progeny might respond to the arguments 
made above by arguing that Delaware law is not static, which is certainly 
true.351  “It must grow and develop in response to, indeed in anticipation of, 
evolving concepts and needs,” to quote Unocal itself.352  Perhaps the 
chancery court is groping toward a new understanding of Revlon, which 
would necessitate a broader application to a wider array of transactions.353 
In particular, the emphasis on allocation of the control premia in Vice 
Chancellor Laster’s bench ruling in Steinhardt suggests a concern that 
target managers may have sold too cheaply.  Put another way, “Vice 
Chancellor Laster was concerned that the target stockholders’ interest in the 
 
 349. See supra notes 194–96 and accompanying text (discussing investor preferences 
with respect to the allocation of gains when the postmerger entity does not have a controlling 
shareholder). 
 350. See supra notes 197–98 and accompanying text (discussing investor preferences 
with respect to the allocation of gains when the postmerger entity has a controlling 
shareholder). 
 351. See Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 957 (Del. 1985) (noting 
that Delaware “corporate law is not static”). 
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 353. Of course, even if the chancery court is correct in this regard, the evolution properly 
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and its progeny.  In In re Synthes, Inc. Shareholder Litigation, 50 A.3d 1022 (Del. Ch. 
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blended consideration represents the last chance they have to get a premium for their Synthes 
shares.” Id. at 1047.  Chancellor Strine squarely rejected this argument, holding that the 
plaintiffs were “wrong on the merits.” Id.  The Chancellor based that holding on the “binding 
authority of our Supreme Court as set forth in QVC and its progeny,” pursuant to which 
“Revlon duties only apply when a corporation undertakes a transaction that results in the sale 
or change of control.” Id.  As suggested by his use of the word “binding,” trial courts are 
supposed to follow higher court precedents even when they disagree with them. 
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target’s assets could be diluted and value improperly transferred to the 
buyer’s stockholders if the target board failed to secure an adequate price in 
the merger.”354  By invoking Revlon and its associated reasonableness 
standard, the Vice Chancellor gave himself far greater latitude to evaluate 
the merits of the sale than would be allowed under the business judgment 
rule. 
If this is the direction in which the chancery court is seeking to evolve 
Revlon, however, there are a number of reasons to abort that effort.  First, 
although Steinhardt could be understood as a logical extension of the 
repeated concerns expressed in Lukens and its progeny with final period 
transactions, the concern manifests itself in the former via a much different 
legal rule.  Instead of focusing on what percentage of the consideration 
takes the form of cash, Vice Chancellor Laster focused on what percentage 
of the combined entity will be held by former target shareholders.355  This 
doctrinal shift is essential to effectuating the new policy goal because the 
percentage of the consideration taking the form of cash is wholly irrelevant 
to determining whether the target board obtained an adequate price (or, for 
that matter, whether the target board had a conflict of interest).  Indeed, if 
nothing else, Vice Chancellor Laster’s holding in Steinhardt at least 
exposed, albeit sub silentio, the inherent flaw in the reasoning of Lukens 
and its progeny.  Simply put, the percentage of the consideration paid in 
cash advances no cognizable policy concern. 
Second, if the new standard is to be that Revlon is triggered when the 
target shareholders will end up with a small percentage of the stock of the 
post-transaction combined entity, that standard is both unworkable and 
illogical.  Any point at which one draws the line will necessarily be 
arbitrary.  Whether the target shareholders end up with 1 percent or 99 
percent  of the stock of the post-transaction corporation, there will still be a 
risk that the target board may have failed to obtain an adequate price. 
These observations demonstrate that neither the form of the consideration 
nor the percentage of the combined entity ultimately owned by former 
target shareholders adequately responds to Vice Chancellor Laster’s 
concern.  Indeed, no trigger could satisfactorily address that concern, 
because it is inevitably present in all corporate acquisitions.  As noted 
above, sometimes side payments from the favored bidder may induce the 
target board to accept a lower price than the maximum attainable.356  Other 
times, however, the target board may simply have made mistakes.  
Addressing the Vice Chancellor’s concern thus requires extending the QVC 
reasonableness standard to all corporate acquisitions, so that the court can 
determine whether the target board got an adequate price and, if not, why 
not. 
 
 354. Haas, supra note 314. 
 355. See supra notes 319–20 and accompanying text (discussing the Steinhardt holding). 
 356. See supra notes 73–74 (discussing the impact of side payments). 
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This is a step the Delaware courts have been unwilling to take.  The 
reason they have declined to do so is probably captured by Chancellor 
Allen’s warning that, unless Unocal was carefully applied, “courts—in 
exercising some element of substantive judgment—will too readily seek to 
assert the primacy of their own view on a question upon which reasonable, 
completely disinterested minds might differ.”357  This is true even with 
respect to the adequacy of the price received by the target, as the Delaware 
Supreme Court explained in Time, by stating that courts should not 
substitute their “judgment as to what is a ‘better’ deal for that of a 
corporation’s board of directors.”358 
This is so, the Court explained, because “Delaware law confers the 
management of the corporate enterprise to the stockholders’ duly elected 
board representatives. . . .  That duty may not be delegated to the 
stockholders.”359  Prior to Lukens and its progeny, the Delaware courts thus 
seemed to recognize the tension between authority and accountability that 
was discussed in Part I.C above.  Indeed, it is striking how precisely 
Chancellor Allen’s warning echoes the argument above that one cannot 
make an actor more accountable without simultaneously transferring some 
aliquot of his decision-making authority to the entity empowered to hold 
him to account.  As we saw in that part, there are strong policy reasons not 
to do so even in the context of corporate acquisitions.  Accordingly, the 
Delaware courts should not go further down the road toward applying a 
substantive reasonableness analysis to all corporate acquisitions.360 
CONCLUSION 
Revlon should be understood as a special case of the Unocal heightened 
scrutiny standard of review.  The target board of directors’ sole Revlon duty 
is to obtain the best deal for their shareholders.  In so doing, any favoritism 
of one bidder over another must be motivated by a concern for immediate 
shareholder value and not by any improper motives. 
One enters Revlon-land through any one of three checkpoints:  (1) the 
target’s board initiates an active bidding process to sell the corporation or to 
effect a business reorganization involving a clear breakup of the company; 
(2) in response to an initial offer, the target’s board causes the corporation 
to abandon the corporation’s long-term strategy and seeks an alternative 
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transaction involving the breakup of the company; (3) the transaction 
results in a sale or change of control of the corporation. 
Contrary to recent chancery court opinions, Checkpoint 3 is not 
dependent on the form of the consideration paid by the acquirer.  If 
dispersed shareholders own the post-transaction combined entity in “a 
large, fluid, changeable and changing market,” Revlon does not apply.  If 
the post-transaction entity has a controlling shareholder, however, 
regardless of whether the corporation goes private or remains listed on a 
stock market, Revlon does apply.  In other words, there must be a change of 
control, whether by sale or otherwise. 
